XII

ELABORANDO LOS PLANES

^[1] Steinberg, Bismarck, pp. 57-60; Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 110-113. <<

^[2] Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 120-121. <<

^[3] Ibid., p. 127. <<

^[4] Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 134. <<

^[5] Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 130-131. <<

^[6] Ibid., pp. 124 y 129-131. <<

^[7] Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 277. <<

^[8] Echevarria, «Heroic History», p. 585; Mombauer, «German War Plans», p. 52 nota 10. <<

^[9] Snyder, «Civil-Military Relations», p. 35. <<

^[10] Förster, «Dreams and Nightmares», pp. 359-360. <<

^[11] Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 277. <<

^[12] Herwig, The Marne, p. 33. <<

^[13] Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, pp. 100-105; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 117. <<

^[14] Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 301-302. <<

^[15] Foley, German Strategy, pp. 6-7. <<

^[16] Herwig, «From Tirpitz Plan to Schlieffen Plan», p. 55. <<

^[17] Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, p. 317. <<

^[18] Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, p. 206. <<

^[19] Ibid. <<

^[20] Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, p. 46. <<

^[21] Ibid., pp. 42-46. <<

^[22] Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 300. <<

^[23] Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, vol. II, pp. 201-202. <<

^[24] Maurer, The Outbreak of The First World War, p. 37. <<

^[25] Herwig, «From Tirpitz Plan to Schlieffen Plan», p. 59. <<

^[26] Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, p. 59. <<

^[27] Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 223-225. <<

^[28] Kronenbitter, Krieg im Frieden, p. 311. <<

^[29] Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 240. <<

^[30] Kessler, Journey to the Abyss, p. 658; Foley, «Debate. The Real Schlieffen Plan», p. 222. <<

^[31] Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 203. <<

^[32] Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 84. <<

^[33] Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 55. <<

^[34] Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, pp. 258-259; Afflerbach, Falkenhayn. Politisches, p. 79. <<

^[35] Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, p. 165. <<

^[36] Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, pp. 263-264. <<

^[37] Mombauer, «German War Plans», p. 57. <<

^[38] Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 280. <<

^[39] Showalter, «From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine», p. 696. <<

^[40] Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 152. <<

^[41] Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, vol. II, pp. 88-9. <<

^[42] Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 390. <<

^[43] Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, vol. II, pp. 84-85. <<

^[44] Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 225-229; Beyens, Germany Before the War, pp. 36-38. <<

^[45] Mombauer, «German War Plans», pp. 48-79. <<

^[46] Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 390. <<

^[47] Hewitson, Germany and the Causes, p. 118. <<

^[48] Herrmann, The Arming of Europe, pp. 96-97. <<

^[49] Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, p. 210. <<

^[50] Hewitson, Germany and the Causes, pp. 131-133; Hewitson, «Images of the Enemy», passim. <<

^[51] Herrmann, The Arming of Europe, pp. 132-133. <<

^[52] Ibid., p. 84. <<

^[53] Ibid., pp. 91-95. <<

^[54] Mombauer, «German War Plans», p. 57. <<

^[55] Herwig, «Imperial Germany», p. 71. <<

^[56] Herwig, «Disjointed Allies», p. 273. <<

^[57] Herrmann, The Arming of Europe, p. 101. <<

^[58] Gooch, «Italy before 1915», pp. 211-222; Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, pp. 167-169. <<

^[59] Maurer, The Outbreak of The First World War, p. 33; Herwig, «Disjointed Allies», pp. 271-272; Ritter, «Zusammenarbeit», p. 535. <<

^[60] Herwig, «Disjointed Allies», p. 271 nota 9. <<

^[61] Williamson, Austria-Hungary, pp. 87-88. <<

^[62] Kronenbitter, Krieg im Frieden, p. 282. <<

^[63] Stone, «V. Moltke-Conrad», pp. 201-202 y passim. <<

^[64] Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, p. 85. <<

^[65] Stevenson, «War by Timetable?», pp. 181-182. <<

^[66] Stone, «V. Moltke-Conrad», p. 204 nota 7. <<

^[67] Kronenbitter, «Nur los lassen», p. 39. <<

^[68] Herrmann, The Arming of Europe, pp. 234 y 237. <<

^[69] Stone, «V. Moltke-Conrad», pp. 213-214. <<

^[70] Herwig, «Disjointed Allies», p. 278. <<

^[71] Menning, «The Offensive Revisited», p. 226. <<

^[72] Armour, «Colonel Redl: Fact and Fantasy», pp. 175-176. <<

^[73] Ibid., pp. 179-180; Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, pp. 124-127. <<

^[74] Stevenson, «War by Timetable?», pp. 177-178; Heywood, «The Most Catastrophic Question», pp. 46 y 54. <<

^[75] Menning, «The Offensive Revisited», p. 224. <<

^[76] Menning, «Pieces of the Puzzle», p. 782. <<

^[77] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», pp. 109 y 122-124. <<

^[78] Shatsillo, Ot Portsmutskogo, p. 199. <<

^[79] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», p. 110. <<

^[80] Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 151-156. <<

^[81] Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 427-433. <<

^[82] Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook, p. 11. <<

^[83] Fuller, The Foe Within, pp. 46-48. <<

^[84] Turner, «Role of the General Staffs», p. 317; Paléologue, Ambassador’s Memoirs, vol. I, p. 83. <<

^[85] Rich, The Tsar’s Colonels, p. 221. <<

^[86] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», pp. 100-101. <<

^[87] Spring, «Russia and the Franco-Russian Alliance», pp. 568-569, 578-579 y passim. <<

^[88] Menning, «The Offensive Revisited», p. 219. <<

^[89] Airapetov, Poslednyaya Voina Imperatorskoi Rossii, pp. 174-175; Shatsillo, Ot Portsmutskogo, pp. 65-67. <<

^[90] Menning, «Pieces of the Puzzle», p. 788. <<

^[91] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», pp. 111-112 y 118-121. <<

^[92] Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 178. <<

^[93] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», pp. 111-113; Menning, «The Offensive Revisited», p. 225. <<

^[94] Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 440-441. <<

^[95] Menning, «Pieces of the Puzzle», p. 796. <<

^[96] Menning, «War Planning», p. 121. <<

^[97] Airapetov, «K voprosu o prichinah porazheniya russkoi armii»; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 189-194. <<

^[98] Fuller, «The Russian Empire», pp. 110-111. <<

^[99] Airapetov, «K voprosu o prichinah porazheniya russkoi armii»; Menning, «War Planning», pp. 122-125. <<

^[100] Andrew, «France and the German Menace», p. 147. <<

^[101] Ignat’ev, 50 Let v Stroyu, pp. 390-391. <<

^[102] Schmidt, Frankreichs Aussenpolitik, pp. 182-183. <<

^[103] Ignat’ev, 50 Let v Stroyu, p. 392. <<

^[104] Messimy, Mes Souvenirs, p. 118 nota 1; Porch, The March to the Marne, pp. 184-185. <<

^[105] Porch, The March to the Marne, pp. 216-223. <<

^[106] Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», p. 163. <<

^[107] Doughty, «France», p. 160. <<

^[108] Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p. 26. <<

^[109] Doughty, «France», p. 159. <<

^[110] Becker, 1914, Comment les Français, p. 43 nota 174. <<

^[111] Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», p. 164. <<

^[112] Porch, The March to the Marne, pp. 129-132. <<

^[113] Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», p. 137. <<

^[114] Doughty, «France», p. 154. <<

^[115] Ibid., 154; Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», p. 156. <<

^[116] Doughty, «France», p. 153. <<

^[117] Herwig, «Imperial Germany», p. 70. <<

^[118] Schmidt, Frankreichs Aussenpolitik, pp. 165-167. <<

^[119] Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», p. 163. <<

^[120] Ibid., p. 159. <<

^[121] Ibid., p. 166. <<

^[122] Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 102-103. <<

^[123] Tanenbaum, «French Estimates», pp. 170-171. <<

^[124] Doughty, «France», p. 163. <<

^[125] Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, p. 226. <<

^[126] Doughty, «France», pp. 165-168; Doughty, «French Strategy in 1914», p. 434. <<

^[127] Doughty, «France», p. 165. <<

^[128] Porch, The March to the Marne, pp. 232-233. <<

^[129] Messimy, Mes Souvenirs, p. 179. <<