Notas

^[1] «Night Combat», Military Review 24 (February 1948): 81, translated and digested from an article in Revista de la Oficialidad de Complemento, Apendice de la Revista Ejercito (Spain), May 1947. <<

^[2] The storming of Kars and Erzerum, the capture of Ft. Hafiz, and the battle of Shipka were examples of Russian night operations that captured the attention of the European press of that day. Night Fighting, 2d ed. (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1893), p. 9, photocopy of published pamphlet containing translation of article from Svoennei Sbornik [Russian military magazine], December 1885, CARL 355.422 S968n2. <<

^[3] Gorman C. Smith, «Division Night Attack Doctrine» (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1964), pp. 80-81. <<

^[4] Guenther Blumentritt, «Operations in Darkness and Smoke», draft translation by A. Schroeder, mimeographed (U.S. Army, Europe, Historical Division, 1952), pp. 4, 19, MS B-683, CARL N 17785. <<

^[5] V. Panov, «The Great Patriotic War and Postwar Period», URMA, no. 1557 (16 January 1981): 68, JPRS 77187, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, October 1980. <<

^[6] V. Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», pp. 2-3, translated by the AC of S, G-2, U.S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, from an article in Voyennyi Vestnik [Military Herald], no. 9, 1946. <<

^[7] Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1965), p. 89. <<

^[8] Albert Kesselring et al., «Night Combat», mimeographed (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, U.S. Army European Command, July 1952), p. 7, MS P-054a, CARL N17500.17A. <<

^[9] M. Lukin, «In the Vyaz'ma Operation», URMA, no. 1643 (7 January 1982): 35-45, JPRS 79812, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, September 1981. <<

^[10] Kesselring, «Night Combat», p. 7. <<

^[11] «Peculiarities of Russian Warfare», rev. ed., mimeographed (U.S. Army, Historical Division, June 1949), pp. 141-43, MS T-22, CARL N16276 (hereafter cited as «Peculiarities»). <<

^[12] Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972, 1965), p. 190. <<

^[13] «Peculiarities», pp. 141-43. <<

^[14] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 61. The Soviets used submachine gunners to lead night attacks, thus creating the impression that their forces were larger than they actually were. <<

^[15] Blumentritt, «Operations in Darkness and Smoke», pp. 21-22. <<

^[16] Yo Sukhinin, «Combat Action of Rifle Divisions at Night», translated by Lt. Col. David M. Glantz from the Russian article in VIZ, December 1977, pp. 50-51. Russian night attacks were not, of course, always successful. Although the Russians encircled 4,000 Germans at Cholm during the winter of 1941-42, they were not able to destroy them because their pattern of day and night attacks (128 in 105 days) was too predictable. This allowed the Germans sufficient time to shift forces within their perimeter and eventually to break out. See James Sidney Lucas, War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), pp. 196-205. <<

^[17] I. I. Lisov, Parachutists —Airborne Landing, translated for the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center by ACSI (1968; Washington, DC, 10 December 1969), pp. 84-139, DTIC AD 700943. <<

^[18] Blumentritt, «Operations in Darkness and Smoke», pp. 1-2. <<

^[19] There were, of course, German officers who maintained that their troops were more resistant to «the psychic effects of night» and that the Russian flanks were vulnerable to surprise at night. Kesselring, «Night Combat», pp. 1-3. According to Kesselring, German combat tactics, which were dependent upon the «initiative of lower echelon commanders», were hindered at night by an inability to recognize important defensive positions or accurately adjust fire. Ibid., p. v. <<

^[20] Department of Research into and Application of Wartime Experience, General Staff of the Red Army, Collection of Materials for the Study of War Experience, no. 8, August-October 1942 (Moscow, 1943), translated by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Canadian Army Headquarters, Ottawa, 30 November 1955, pp. 126-29, CARL N16582.178-B. The authors considered the lack of air cover and feigned crossing sites as the main shortcomings of this operation. Ibid., p. 131. Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», p. 5, says this operation forced the Germans to divert three infantry divisions away from the drive on Stalingrad. <<

^[21] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 66. <<

^[22] Peter Ribakov, «Soviet Night Attacks with Tanks», The Cavalry Journal 54 (May-June 1945): 65. <<

^[23] Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, translated by H. Betzler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 237. Almost a year to the day before this battle the Soviets had used an enveloping attack at night to take Chern in the Moscow offensive. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 209. <<

^[24] Amazasp Babadjanyan, «Tank and Mechanized Forces», in The Battle of Kursk, pp. 176-86 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), reprinted in P312 Offensive Tactics Advance Sheets (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1981), pp. 194-95. The 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies, with about 800 vehicles each, acted as an armored wedge «to press home the attack in operational depth.» Ibid. <<

^[25] «Peculiarities», pp. 92-97; Paul Karl Schmidt [Paul Carell], Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War, 1943-1944 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), pp. 356-59. During this operation the Russians infiltrated by night a motorized infantry unit of about battalion strength into the German artillery position at Lyubotin, west of Kharkov. The next day the Germans discovered the unit and destroyed it. See «Peculiarities», p. 95. <<

^[26] Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 289-90. <<

^[27] Z. Alexandrov, «Night Attack», Soviet Military Review, August 1978, p. 48. <<

^[28] P. Milovanov, «Crossing the Dnieper», Military Review 24 (June 1944): 111-13, translated from a Russian article in Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 17 November 1943; Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1964), pp. 773-74. <<

^[29] Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 223. Russian river crossing techniques ignored the German principle of Schwerpunkt or «main blow» and instead advocated what Liddell Hart referred to as a «dispersed advance with distributed aim, i.e., against a number of objects simultaneously.» On the Dnieper it was a case of dispersed attacks on a wide front that triumphed over a concentrated defense, which although mobile, could not always be shifted in time to meet threats too numerous for the reserves to deal with. W. R. Young, «Russian Strategy and Tactics», Military Review 24 (March 1945): 122, digested from an article in The Fighting Forces (Great Britain), 1944. <<

^[30] Lisov, Parachutists, pp. 140-52. See Schmidt, Scorched Earth, pp. 407-11, whose account, based mostly on captured German sources, is also interesting, but not entirely accurate. He correctly points out that the Russians pioneered airborne operations with their exercises in the Caucasus in 1932 and quotes a Soviet marshal who expressed sadness that these paratroops were employed without «practicable plans». <<

^[31] Lisov, Parachutists, pp. 150-63; Sergei Matveevich Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War (1941-1945) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), pp. 185-87. <<

^[32] A. Zvenzlovsky, «Night Attack», Soviet Military Review, May 1973, pp. 50-52; Vasilii Ivanovich Chuikov, V Boyakh Za Ukrainu [In the Battle for the Ukraine] (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Politcheskoi Litertury Ukrainy, 1972), pp. 81-108, translated by Lt. Col. David M. Glantz; Sukhinin, «Combat Action», pp. 50-51. <<

^[33] 33. Chuikov, «Street Fighting— The Lessons of Stalingrad», Military Review 24 (October 1944): 98-99, digested from an article in An Cosantoir (Ireland), March 1944, that was reprinted from Chuikov's The Epic Story of Stalingrad (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.). Chuikov's 62d Army at Stalingrad was later renamed 8th Guards Army. In June 1943 his staff had issued a special order on using light signals in night operations (Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 64). <<

^[34] Chuikov, «Street Fighting», pp. 98-99; Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 67; Alexandrov, «Night Attack», p. 48. <<

^[35] Schmidt, Scorched Earth, pp. 424-27; Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 65. <<

^[36] Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 51. <<

^[37] John Erickson, «Soviet Combined Arms: Theory and Practice», photocopy of typescript (Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh, September 1979), p. 51. Soviet authors do not attempt to quantify their night operations, but seek rather to explain the transition in the words of a former German General Staff officer, General Middledorf, who wrote: «Late in 1943 the Russians drew correct conclusions from their rich experience in night operations. They started to launch offensives at night, usually setting the forces' missions to a considerable depth. They used large tank forces to fulfill these missions and this often brought them success.» See Z. Shutov, «Night Operations», Soviet Military Review, September 1981, p. 36; Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 68. <<

^[38] N. Kobrin, «Encirclement Operations», Soviet Military Review, August 1981, p. 38. German accounts refer to this encirclement as the Cherkassy pocket, although the city of Cherkassy was not in the pocket. <<

^[39] Werth, Russia at War, pp. 778-81. Russian accounts indicate that the Germans were unsuccessful at breaking the encirclement and claim 55,000 German casualties and 18,000 prisoners. German accounts acknowledge 20,000 men captured or killed, but claim that 30,000 or more escaped. <<

^[40] Alexandrov, «Night Attack», p. 49. <<

^[41] Shutov, «Night Operations», p. 36. <<

^[42] The reconnaissance in force (also referred to as reconnaissance in strength) was an important means of determining precise enemy locations and was sufficiently varied to confuse the Germans as to exact timing of Soviet offensives. Because the Germans, at this stage in the war, had the habit of withdrawing into the depths of their defenses to avoid the devastating Soviet artillery preparation, the reconnaissance in strength was often a key to Soviet success. This was the case in the Lvov-Sandomir Operation (July-August 1944), in which a Soviet reconnaissance in strength conducted at night discovered that the Germans were withdrawing from their first line of defenses. See A. Popov, «Reconnaissance in Strength», Soviet Military Review, March 1979, pp. 39-41. <<

^[43] Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», p. 4. <<

^[44] S. Shishkin, «The Vitebsk Operation», Military Review 25 (July 1945): 96-97, translated from a Russian article in Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 25 October 1944. <<

^[45] P. Boldyrev, «The Bobruisk Operation», Military Review 24 (March 1945): 105-8, translated and digested from a Russian article in Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 28 September 1944. <<

^[46] Apparently unaware of a similar attack earlier at Kiev, Beloborodov expressed his appreciation in a recent interview to his former commanders for approving his innovative and successful tactic. A. P. Beloborodov, «About Some Military Leaders» (Interview), Soviet Military Review, July 1981, pp. 49-51. <<

^[47] Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 51. <<

^[48] Evidences of Soviet specialized training extend back at least as far as the campaigns in the Ukraine in 1943, where one Soviet division trained special destroyer battalions for reconnaissance and surprise attacks on strongpoints. A night attack by one of these destroyer battalions on the village of Khotomlya succeeded in routing a garrison of 700 men from the German 294th Infantry Division, but only because the signal for the attack (a red flare) was given by a German sentry, who was employing the flare because he had detected Soviet troops crawling towards his position. See Captain Sokolsky, «Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya», Military Review 24 (June 1944): 93-95, translated from Voyennyi Vestnik [Military Herald], June 1943. <<

^[49] The advanced detachments of the llth Guards Army conducted five night exercises before their participation in the East Prussian campaign, while the 3d Guards Tank Army conducted half of its exercises at night before the Vistula-Oder operation, according to Panov, «Great Patriotic War», pp. 64-66. <<

^[50] K. Galitsky, «Certain Problems Pertaining to Breakthrough of Position Defenses», translated by the AC of S, G-2, Department of the Army, from Voyennyi Vestnik [Military Herald], October 1945, p. 10, CARL N 18603.26; Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 65; Sukhinin, «Combat Action», pp. 51-52. <<

^[51] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 66. <<

^[52] M. Y. Katukov, Spearhead of the Main Effort (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1974), excerpts reprinted in Soviet Military Review, special supplement, September 1976, pp. 14-15. <<

^[53] Ibid., pp. 15-16. Because of the interrogation of German prisoners captured in the area by a patrol of the 1st Guards Tank Army on 26 January, the Soviets knew that many sectors of the line at Meseritz were not yet manned. See Otto Preston Chaney, Zhukov (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 298. <<

^[54] A good discussion on the controversy concerning the halt in February may be found in Chaney, Zhukov, pp. 300-306, where he also points out Zhukov's genuine concern and insight regarding the threat to his north from German forces in Pomerania. For another view, see Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin, translated from the German by Ruth Kisch (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 116-22. <<

^[55] Normally used in the air defense role, searchlights were also employed against a German division in the mountains of Italy in 1944 by Americans attempting to restrict the unit's movement at night. Albert Kesselring et al., «Night Combat: Project #40», typescript (U.S. Army, Historical Division, European Command, April 1950), p. 61, MS P-0546, CARL N17500.17-B. <<

^[56] The reconnaissance was probably confined to the first and possibly second line of defenses in a defense in depth that extended back some thirty to forty kilometers. General Chuikov indicated his dissatisfaction with the information obtained on the «Nazi defense system, the grouping of forces, [and] the disposition of reserves.» See Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin, p. 171. <<

^[57] Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», pp. 5-6. <<

^[58] Chaney, Zhukov, pp. 307-8, discusses the competition between the two marshals. The role of the Second Byelorussian Front north of the city should also be noted. <<

^[59] Andrew Tully, Berlin, Story of a Battle (1963; reprint ed., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 81. According to Tully the Soviets fired 41,600 cannon and rocket launchers along a 250-mile front. Shutov, «Night Operations», p. 36, said there were 325 guns per square kilometer of frontage. <<

^[60] Reprints from the Soviet Press, 30 April 1975, pp. 25-34, quoted in C. M. Flannery, «Night Operations— The Soviet Approach» (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1978), p. 14. <<

^[61] Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin, pp. 147-51; Chaney, Zhukov, p. 312; Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 52. <<

^[62] Vasily Yezhakov, «The Berlin Operation», Soviet Military Review, April 1975, p. 44; Chaney, Zhukov, pp. 312-16. <<

^[63] Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», p. 9. Guards mortars are multiple-rocket launchers. <<

^[64] «Red Army Field Service Regulations, 1944», mimeographed, translated by the AC of S, G-2, Department of the Army, 1952, p. 66. The regulation states that the «chief requisites for the success of the attack» include «strict secrecy as to the approaching attack, concealed concentration and movement of the troops into the jump-off position and surprise attack...» This was not accomplished in the regrouping of eighteen Soviet armies, fifteen of which were moved a distance of about 365 kilometers and three of which were moved between 530 and 800 kilometers. See V. Kiselev, «Documents and Materials on the 35th Anniversary of the Berlin Operation», URMA, no. 1532 (10 September 1980): 76, JPRS 76399, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, May 1980. <<

^[65] Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin, pp. 143-44, notes both deficiencies but points out that secretive movement of tanks and artillery into their starting positions was not possible because of skillful employment of searchlights by the Germans on the Seelow Heights and of flares dropped from aircraft to illuminate the valley. This does not explain, however, why concealment was not maintained during the buildup for the general offensive. <<

^[66] Upon reaching the Memel and the Vistula in early 1945 after a five-week campaign, the Soviets had covered 435 miles at a blitzkrieg tempo that matched Guderian's and Moth's pace along the Brest-Smolensk-Yelnya road in 1941. Schmidt, Scorched Earth, p. 596. <<

^[67] S. P. Ivanov, ed., Nachal'nyi period voiny [The initial phase of war] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), pp. 282-83, quoted in Lilita I. Dzirkals, «Lightning War» in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, January 1976), p. 5. The campaign was particularly time sensitive to the Soviets because they wanted their victory to be completed before America forced Japan out of the war. The first use of the atomic bomb on 6 August 1945 heightened this sensitivity. <<

^[68] M. V. Zakharov, ed., Finale, translated by David Skvirsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 70-75. The Soviets employed «2,500,000 effectives, over 42,000 guns and mortars, over 6200 tanks and SPGs and 8300 combat aircraft» in the Berlin operation (Yezhakov, «The Berlin Operation», p. 42). <<

^[69] David M. Glantz, «Soviet Operations in Manchuria, August 1945», typescript (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1982), pt 4, pp. 5-9. <<

^[70] Zakharov. Finale, pp. 102-3; Dzirka1s, «Lightning War», p. 41. <<

^[71] Dzirkals, «Lightning War», pp. 128-29; Glantz, «Soviet Operations», pt. 2, p. 2. Reinforcements to the 6th Guards Tank Army converted it to a mechanized army consisting of forty-four motorized infantry battalions and twenty-five tank battalions. John Despres, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, July 1976), p. 46, DTIC ADA 028881. <<

^[72] Istoriia Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny. 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War, 1939-1945], 12 vols. (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1972), 11: 5, 10-12, translated under contract by the U.S. government; Alexsandr A. Luchinskiy, «The Transbaikal Troops in the Hills of Manchuria», translated under contract by the U.S. government from the Russian article in VIZ, August 1971, pp. 7-8. <<

^[73] Zakharov, Finale, pp. 135-38; Dzirkals, «Lightning War», p. 52; Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, A Study of Breakthrough Operations (Dunn Loring, VA, October 1976), p. 80. Zakharov, p. 92, states that GHQ had originally planned to use searchlights but canceled the idea after exercises showed this impractical in heavily wooded, mountainous terrain. Nonetheless, Marshal Meretskov was apparently prepared to use them. <<

^[74] K. Kalashnikov, «Memoirs: On the Far Eastern Borders», URMA, no. 1549 (8 December 1980): 60-61, JPRS 76953, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, August 1980; N. Tsygankov, «Certain Features of Combat Operations of the 5th Army in the Harbin-Kirin Operation», translated under contract by the U.S. government from the Russian article in VIZ, August 1975. As an exception, the 35th Army employed an artillery preparation against the Hutou fortified area. <<

^[75] A. P. Beloborodov, «In the Hills of Manchuria», URMA, no. 1587 (4 May 1981): 104-9, JPRS 77987, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, December 1980. <<

^[76] S. Pechenenko, «An Army Offensive Under Conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations», VIZ, August 1978, pp. 42-49, translated under contract by the U.S. government; Glantz, «Soviet Operations in Manchuria», pt. 9, pp. 7-10. <<

^[77] Zakharov, Finale, pp. 144-45, 171-72. <<

^[78] W. D. Duncan, «Tanks and Infantry in Night Attacks», Military Review 27 (October 1947): 46-47; Smith, «Division Night Attack Doctrine», pp. 88-109. Duncan also notes that the Japanese used night penetrations and infiltrations against inexperienced U.S. units during the first years of the war. Americans in the Pacific adopted the use of night attacks against strongpoints when the Japanese began to withdraw the bulk of their forces at night to avoid U.S. artillery fire. <<

^[79] The pace of Soviet operations was particularly intense in mid-1945, when the Soviets had their eyes trained on both the Americans and the Manchurian theater, which they wanted to open as soon as possible. In his drive on Prague, for example, Marshal Konev demanded a faster rate of advance from his army commanders despite the fact that his forces had advanced from ten to twenty-three kilometers on the night of 6-7 May 1945. Infantry and tanks were separated and given twenty-four-hour objectives of thirty to fortyfive kilometers and fifty to sixty kilometers, respectively. On the night of 8-9 May, two of his tank armies covered eighty kilometers, bypassing obstacles and ignoring fatigue, in order to reach the Czechoslovakian capital. See I. Konev, «The Prague Operation», Soviet Military Review, May 1975, pp. 47-49. <<

^[80] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 61. <<

^[81] K. Moskalenko, «Offensive from Lutezh Bridgehead», Soviet Military Review, September 1966, pp. 41-44. <<

^[82] S. Shtemenko, «General Staff During the War», Soviet Military Review, September 1974, p. 61. <<

^[83] See Nicolai Kostrov, «Soviet Night Attacks; CavaIry-i-1945», The Cavalry Journal 54 (May-June 1945): 64, for a discussion of the use of Soviet cavalry in 1945; U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-230: Russian Combat Methods in World War II (November 1950; reprinted (Washington, DC, 1982), pp. 100-102, for the German view on the effectiveness of the Russian air force. <<

^[84] Max Simon, Generalleutnant Waffen SS, quoted in Kesselring, «Night Combat: Project #40», p. 59. <<

^[85] Kesselring, «Night Combat», pp. 2-5. <<

^[86] Curt Gallenkamp, quoted in Kesselring, «Night Combat: Project #40», p. 91. <<

^[87] The Soviet command concentrated 1,400,000 men for this campaign, but left four of the six Soviet tank armies on the southern wing of the front, thus deceiving the Germans into expecting a major blow farther to the south. See P. I. Batov, «The Blow in Byelorussia», Soviet Military Review, June 1979, pp. 6-9. <<

^[88] See, for example, Kesselring, «Night Combat», p. 6. The Russians are complimented for adapting their defensive tactics and techniques at night «to the more mobile and versatile German methods» by 1944. <<

^[89] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 64. <<

^[90] A. Sazhin, «Breakthrough of a Fortified Region of the Enemy», p. 9, translated from Voyennyi Vestnik [Military Herald], 1944. <<

^[91] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», pp. 64-65. <<

^[92] Sazhin, «Breakthrough», p. 14. <<

^[93] General Staff of the Red Army, «Soviet Manual on Breakthrough of Fortified Areas», mimeographed 1944 translation by the AC of S, G-2, GSUSA, of the Soviet field regulation (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Defense, 1944), pp. 19, 30, CARL R16582.105. <<

^[94] Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 52. <<

^[95] Galitsky, «Certain Problems», p. 10. <<

^[96] «Red Army Field Service Regulations, 1944», p. 134. <<

^[97] Kuznetsov, «Night Actions», p. 1. <<

^[98] Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 63. <<

^[99] Ibid., p. 67. <<

^[100] Sazhin, «Breakthrough», p. 22. <<

^[101] Almost all Soviet works on military history have at least a paragraph devoted to the role of political workers in preparing the troops for battle. See, for example, Batov, «The Blow in Byelorussia», p. 7. Although this is certainly propaganda, the role of such workers in preparing troops psychologically to fight at night cannot be discounted. Among the more famous party political workers in the army in the war were Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. <<

^[102] The fact is evident in almost any Soviet work on the war, but a particularly good discussion of this is in M. Kozlov, «The Organization and Conduct of Strategic Defenses from the Experiences of the Great Patriotic War», URMA. no. 1587 (4 May 1981): 31, JPRS 77987, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, December 1980. <<

^[103] Similarly, in Manchuria, Beloborodov in conjunction with his corps commanders had his plans drawn up and approved by the front and theater commanders before the start of the operation. See Beloborodov, «Hills of Manchuria», pp. 108-9. <<

^[104] M. Y. Katukov, «The Armored Brigade in the Forward Element», translated by the Eurasian Branch, Historical Division, U.S. Army from Zhurnal Bronetankovykh i Mekhanizirovannykh Voisk [Journal of armored and mechanized troops], 1945. <<

^[105] I. Tretyak, «The Commander's Creative Activity», URMA, no. 1587 (4 May 1981): 38, JPRS 77987, reprinted from Soviet Military Review, August 1980. <<

^[106] Ibid., p. 39. Panov, «Great Patriotic War», p. 66, expresses the same thoughts: «The use of unusual methods for conducting combat operations and the manifestation of troop boldness and daring are an important factor in achieving success in nighttime combat. Under present-day conditions this also obliges us to carry out an active creative search for the most effective methods of the combat employment of the troops...». <<

^[107] Alexsandr A. Luchinskiy, «Initiative in Combat —Problems in Education: Front-Line Veterans on Their Combat Experience», URMA, no. 1638 (December 1981): 2, JPRS 79602, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Russian article in VIZ, August 1981. <<

^[108] Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 52. <<

^[109] Sukhinin, «Combat Action», p. 52, for example, notes that in the later stages of the war Soviet divisions were assigned night objectives that were four to six kilometers or more in depth, thus corresponding to «close daylight objectives.» <<

^[110] Soviet Army Operations (Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of the Army, Intelligence and Security Command, Threat and Analysis Center, April 1978), pp. 3-14. <<