CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN
PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS SHOULD BE CONTENT WITH VICTORY, BECAUSE WHEN THEY ARE NOT, THEY USUALLY LOSE

Insulting the enemy usually arises from arrogance brought on by victory or a false hope of victory. This false hope makes men err not only in what they say but also in what they do. Once hope enters the heart, it causes man to go too far and risk losing a benefit that is certain in the hope of gaining an even better one that is, however, uncertain. This is a point that merits consideration, because men often let such hope lead them astray to the detriment of their city or state. As I cannot demonstrate my point as clearly with pure reasoning, I would like to demonstrate it with ancient and modern examples.

After Hannibal had routed the Romans at Cannae, he sent emissaries back to Carthage to inform them of his victory and request help.¹⁸⁹ The Carthaginian senate deliberated, and Hanno, an old and prudent citizen, advised that Carthage use its victory wisely and make peace with the Romans. As victors, Hanno argued, the Carthaginians could negotiate a peace with optimal stipulations: It would be a mistake to wait for a defeat to negotiate peace. The Carthaginians’ intention should be to prove to the Romans that the Carthaginians were capable of defeating them, and having achieved victory, Hanno declared, they should not risk losing this opportunity in the hope of an even greater one. Hanno’s suggestion was not adopted, though later the Carthaginian senate, after the opportunity had been lost, saw only too clearly how wise his suggestion had been.

After Alexander the Great had conquered all the East, the Republic of Tyre became aware of Alexander’s importance. Tyre was illustrious and powerful in those days, as its city, like Venice, was on the sea. They sent emissaries to him, avowing that though they were prepared to honor him in every way, they were not prepared to accept him or his men on their land. Alexander was angered that a city would, unlike the rest of the world, close its gates to him. He rebuffed their offer, refused their conditions, and began a siege. Situated on the water, the city was well supplied with the provisions and ammunition necessary for its defense. Within four months Alexander realized that, to Tyre’s glory, this single city had taken up more of his time than many of his other conquests, and so he proposed a treaty, agreeing to all the conditions Tyre had initially stipulated. But the people of Tyre, swollen with pride, did not want to accept his offer, and even killed the emissaries he had sent. Alexander was outraged, and attacked Tyre with such fury that he conquered and destroyed it, killing and enslaving all its people.¹⁹⁰

In 1512 a Spanish army marched into Florentine territory to return the Medici to power and levy tribute on the city. They had been summoned by citizens who had given them hope that the moment they set foot on Florentine land the inhabitants would take up arms in their support. When they marched in, however, they found no one there, and as they were short of supplies they attempted to reach an agreement with Florence. But swollen with pride, the people of Florence rejected this offer, which led to the loss of Prato and the fall of the Florentine government.

Therefore rulers who are attacked cannot make a greater mistake, when they are attacked by men far more powerful, than to refuse a treaty, particularly when it is offered to them. This treaty will never be so unfavorable that it will not in some way benefit the ruler who accepts it, and will be part of his victory. The people of Tyre should have been satisfied that Alexander accepted the conditions he had at first refused. It would have been a sufficient victory for them to have been able, weapons in hand, to make such a man bow to their will. The Florentines also should have been satisfied with the lesser victory of the Spanish army, ceding to some of their wishes without satisfying them all, because the intention of the Spanish army was to overthrow the government of Florence, sever its connection with France, and extract a tribute from the city. If of these three intentions the Spanish army had achieved the last two and allowed the Florentine people to keep their government intact, both sides would have had some honor and some satisfaction. Nor, if they could have kept their liberty, would the Florentine people have needed to care about their old alliance with France or having to pay a tribute to the Spanish army. The Florentines, even if they saw a bigger and almost certain victory within their grasp, put their fate at the discretion of Fortune, staking everything on one card, something a prudent man will do only as a last resort.

After sixteen years of glory, Hannibal left Italy, called back to Carthage to save his fatherland, where he found Hasdrubal and Syphax defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia lost,¹⁹¹ and Carthage reduced to the limits of its city walls, with himself and his army as its last hope. Aware of this, he did not wish to risk the city until he had tried all other measures, and was not ashamed to beg for peace, judging that if his city were to have any hope, it was in peace and not in war. When the enemy turned this down, Hannibal decided to fight with all his might, judging that he might still be able to win, or if he lost, he would lose with glory¹⁹² If Hannibal, who was so valiant and skilled and had his army intact, sought peace before battle when he saw that in losing, Carthage would be enslaved, then what should another man with less valor, skill, and experience do? But men make the mistake of not being able to set limits to their hopes. They base themselves on these hopes without assessing their feasibility, and so come to ruin.

189. A major battle (216 BCE) of the Second Punic War in southeastern Italy in which Hannibal utterly defeated a Roman army of eighty thousand men, of whom only fourteen thousand escaped.

190. In 332 BCE, Alexander the Great, during his campaigns in Phoenicia, had laid siege to Tyre for eight months, finally capturing the city.

191. Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, had formed an allegiance with King Syphax of Numidia to fight the Roman forces in North Africa.

192. Machiavelli is discussing the events described by Livy in Book XXX, chapters 16–31.