CHAPTER FIFTY-EIGHT
ON HOW THE POPULACE IS WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN THE PRINCE

Nothing is more erratic and unstable than the populace, Livy and all the historians maintain, because often in the historians’ narrations one sees the multitude condemning a man to death and afterward fervently wishing him back. This was the case with the Roman populace, which condemned Manlius Capitolinus to death and then lamented him. In Livy’s words: “Soon enough, after he no longer presented a threat, the populace began to long for him.”¹⁴⁴ And elsewhere, when Livy describes the incidents in Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, Hiero’s grandson, he says: “That is the nature of the multitude: It will either serve humbly or dominate arrogantly”¹⁴⁵

I do not know if in upholding an idea which, as I have said, is contrary to the opinion of so many historians, I will be entering a terrain that is so difficult that I shall either have to abandon it with shame or follow it and draw censure upon myself. And yet I do not judge it wrong, nor have I ever done so, to defend an opinion with reasoning, and not with power or force.

I propose that all men—and princes more than anyone else—can be accused of the defect of which historians accuse the populace. In fact, any ruler who is not held in check by laws is apt to make the same errors as an unruly multitude. This is quite evident, because there are and have been many princes, and yet only a few of them good and wise. I am referring here to princes who have managed to break the constraints that might have held them in check. The kings of Egypt, when that land was governed by law in ancient times, were an exception, as were the kings of Sparta and also today’s kings of France, a kingdom better controlled by its laws than any other that we know of in our era. The kings who exist under such constitutions need not be grouped together with those whose natures must be considered separately to see if each is unchecked like the populace. To do so one would have to compare these kings to a populace that is equally kept in check by the laws. And one will find in these kings too the same goodness one sees in the populace, as the populace neither arrogantly dominate nor humbly serve. This was the case with the Roman populace, which, while the republic remained uncorrupted, never served humbly nor dominated arrogantly. In fact, the Roman populace, with their own institutions and magistrates, bore their ranks with honor, and when it became necessary to rise up against a powerful man, the populace did so, as in the cases of Manlius, the Decemvirs, and others who strove to oppress them. And when, for the safety of the public, it was necessary to obey a dictator or the consuls, the Roman populace did so. It is not surprising if the populace lamented Manlius Capitolinus after they had condemned him to death, because they longed for his valor, which was such that the memory of it evoked sympathy in all. Manlius’s valor would have had the same effect on a prince, because it is the verdict of all historians that valor is praised and admired even in one’s enemies. And yet if Manlius could have been resurrected by all that fervent longing, the Roman populace would have passed the same sentence on him as they did when they dragged him from prison and condemned him to death. Nevertheless, we also see princes who were considered wise and still put a man to death and then lamented him, as Alexander the Great had done with Cleitus and other friends, or as Herod had done with Mariamne.¹⁴⁶

But Livy in talking about the nature of the populace, is not talking about a populace restrained by laws, as in Rome, but about a populace not held in check, as was that of Syracuse, where the populace made all the errors usually made by infuriated men not restrained by laws, as was the case with Alexander the Great and Herod. Yet the nature of the populace should not be blamed more than the nature of princes, because both tend to err equally when they can err without fear. There are enough examples of this besides the ones I have just cited, both among the Roman emperors and among other tyrants and princes, who behaved more inconsistently and erratically than any populace ever has.

I therefore disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable, changeable, and ungrateful, and maintain that a populace can be as guilty of this as an individual prince. If one were to accuse both populace and prince of these shortcomings, one would probably be right. But it would be deceiving oneself to accuse the populace and not the prince: because a well-regulated populace that is in power will be stable, prudent, and grateful, just like a prince, or even better than a prince, even if that prince is considered particularly wise. The prince, on the other hand, unchecked by laws, will be more ungrateful, unstable, and imprudent than a populace. The instability of his conduct does not arise from his having a different nature, because all men have the same nature. If there is a greater amount of good, it lies with the populace, because the populace will more or less keep to the laws by which it lives. If we consider the Roman populace, we will see that for four hundred years the people were hostile to the very name of king and championed the glory of the city’s common good, and there are a great number of examples that testify to this. If someone were to point out the ingratitude of the Roman populace toward Scipio, I would respond with the same argument I have already made at length concerning this matter, where the people showed themselves less ungrateful than the princes.¹⁴⁷

But in matters of prudence and stability, I propose that a populace is more prudent, more stable, and has better judgment than a prince. It is not without reason that the voice of the people has been compared to the voice of God. One sees public opinion making surprising prognostications, so that it seems that the populace, as if by some hidden skill, can foresee their good and bad fortune. As for judging things, it is rare that a populace hearing two orators of equal skill arguing for opposing sides will not understand the truth it is hearing and choose the better side. And if the people err in matters of action that are bold or appear to be useful, as I have already discussed, a prince will often be misled by his own passions, which are more numerous than those of the populace.

We also see that in the appointment of magistrates the populace will make far better choices than a prince, nor can one ever persuade a populace that it is good to elect a wicked man with corrupt ways to public office. This is something a prince can easily be persuaded to do in a thousand ways. We also see that when a populace begin to detest something, they can do so for many centuries. This does not happen with princes. In both these matters I would like the Roman populace to suffice as example: In so many elections of consuls and tribunes over the centuries, they did not make four choices that they had cause to repent. And the populace had, as I have said, so much hatred for the name of king that no citizen, however meritorious, who aspired to that name could avoid the deserved punishment. We also see that states ruled by the populace are able to expand their territories quite remarkably in the shortest period, much more so than states that have always been under a prince. Rome proved to be such a state after the expulsion of its king, as was Athens after it freed itself from Pisistratus. This can mean only that a government of the populace is better than that of a prince. Nor do I want all that Livy says in the passage I have cited, or in any other, to be set against my argument, because if we compare all the disorder caused by the populace with all the disorder caused by princes, and all the glories of the populace with all those of princes, we will see that the populace is far superior in goodness and glory. And if princes are superior to the populace in establishing laws, creating civic orders, and organizing statutes and new institutions, the populace has been so much superior in maintaining institutions in an orderly way, that without doubt they add to the glory of those who established them.

Finally, in conclusion, I propose that the states of princes have endured for a long time, as have republics, and that both the one and the other have had to be regulated by laws: A prince who can do as he pleases will prove himself mad, just as a populace who can do as they please will prove themselves unwise. Therefore, if one looks at a prince and a populace who are bound by laws, one will see that there is more skill in the populace than in the prince. If one looks at a prince and a populace who are not bound by laws, one will see fewer mistakes in the populace than in the prince, and these will be less serious and easier to resolve. A good man can speak to an unruly and riotous multitude and easily set it on the right path, but there is no one who can speak to an evil prince, nor is there any other remedy than the blade of a knife. From which one can assess the gravity of the populace’s or the prince’s disorder: To cure that of the populace one needs only words, while to cure that of the prince requires a blade—and here one can only conclude that where one needs a more incisive cure, there are greater ills.

When the people are completely unchecked by laws, their foolish acts are not feared, nor is one afraid of any present evil, but rather of the evil that might arise, since so much confusion can bring forth a tyrant. But with evil princes the opposite happens: One fears the present evil and has hope for the future, since men persuade themselves that the prince’s evil life can give rise to liberty. Hence you can see the difference between the one and the other as a difference between the things that are and the things that will be. The cruelty of the populace is directed against those who the populace fears will seize public property, while the cruelty of the prince is directed against those he fears will take his property. But the bad opinion one has of the populace arises because, even while it is in power, everyone will speak badly about it quite openly, without fear of reprisal, while of princes one always speaks with a thousand fears and a thousand cautions.

144. Machiavelli is quoting Livy (Book VI, chapter 20) in Latin: Populum brevi, posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, desiderium eius tenuit.

145. Machiavelli is quoting Livy (Book XXIV, chapter 25) in Latin: Haec natura multitudinis est: aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur.

146. In a drunken fit, Alexander the Great killed Cleitus, one of his foremost commanders, after which he was inconsolable. King Herod had his wife Mariamne put to death in a fit of jealousy.

147. See chapter 29 above, titled “On Who Is More Ungrateful, a Populace or a Prince,” and also chapter 30.