CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE
ON HOW EASILY THINGS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A STATE WHERE THE POPULACE IS NOT CORRUPTED, AND ON HOW ONE CANNOT CREATE A PRINCIPALITY WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY, OR A REPUBLIC WHERE THERE IS NO EQUALITY

I have already discussed at length what is to be feared or hoped for from a corrupted state,¹³⁸ but it nevertheless strikes me as fitting to consider a decision of the Roman Senate concerning Camillus’s vow to give Apollo one-tenth of the spoils gathered from the people of Veii.¹³⁹ These spoils had come into the hands of the Roman plebeians, and as the Senate was unable to check their value, it passed an edict that everyone should deliver to the treasury a tenth of what they had plundered. To the plebeians’ relief, however, the Senate ultimately decided on a different course of action, having settled on another way of pleasing Apollo, and this decision was not carried out.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it is evident to what extent the Senate had confidence in the plebeians’ honesty, and how it thought that no one would refrain from delivering exactly what the edict commanded. It is also evident that the plebeians did not think of cheating by giving less than they owed, since they strove instead to free themselves of the edict by voicing their outright indignation at it. This example, along with many others already cited, shows how much honesty and pious integrity this populace possessed, and how much good one could expect of it. In fact, nothing good is to be expected where such honesty is lacking, as we see from the states of our era which are so corrupted—Italy above all others. Even France and Spain have some of that corruption, though one does not see as much tumult in those countries as Italy faces every day. In those other countries this does not come so much from the populace’s honesty, which is to a large extent absent, as it does from their having a king who keeps them united, not only through his expertise and skill, but with the help of institutions that are not yet corrupted. This honesty and pious integrity are very apparent in Germany, with the result that many of its states are free, and observe their laws, so that no one dares occupy them, from within or without.¹⁴¹ In order to demonstrate how true it is that there is a good measure of this ancient honesty in the German states, I would like to give an example similar to the one cited above concerning the Roman Senate and plebeians. When the German states need to spend an amount of money for the benefit of the public, the empowered magistrates or councils solicit from all citizens one or two percent of what each has in revenue. When this decision has been made according to the institutions of the state, each citizen presents himself before the tax collectors and, taking an oath to pay the proper sum, drops whatever his conscience compels him to donate into a box set up for that purpose. The man who pays is the sole witness of the amount he pays. From this we can conjecture how much honesty and pious integrity is still present in these men, and it must be assumed that everyone pays the correct sum, otherwise the tax revenue anticipated based on previous collections would not have tallied with the amount received. Should the amounts not tally, the deception would be discovered and another method of collection would have been instituted. Such honesty is all the more admirable in our times, when it has become rarer. In fact, it now seems to exist only in Germany.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that the Germans have not had extensive contact with their neighbors, because neither they nor their neighbors travel to each other’s lands; each is content with his goods and produce, and happy enough to clothe himself in the wool his land provides. This has removed the reason for any contact and the source of any corruption, because the Germans have not been able to pick up French, Spanish, or Italian customs, these nations taken together being the corruption of the world. The second reason is that the states that have an uncorrupted and vital civic order do not allow for any of their citizens to act or live in the manner of a “gentleman”: In fact the citizens maintain equality among themselves and are great enemies of the gentlemen and men of substance of that land. If by chance they get their hands on any of these worthies, they are killed as the source of corruption and the reason for turmoil.

I shall clarify what the title “gentleman” signifies. A gentleman lives in idleness and luxury off the profits of his possessions; he does not concern himself with the cultivation of the land, or submit himself to any of the toil necessary to live. In every state and land such men are pernicious, but even more pernicious are those men who have even greater fortunes, with castles and subjects who obey them. The Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy are filled with both these kinds of gentleman. This is the reason that no republic or vital civic order has ever come about in those lands, because men of this kind are entirely hostile to any form of civil life. To introduce a republic into such states would be impossible, but if someone wanted to reorganize them entirely—that is, if someone were to serve as arbitrator—his only recourse would be to establish a kingdom. This is because where there is so much corruption that laws are not sufficient to halt it, one must combine laws with a larger force. This larger force must be a royal hand that with extreme and absolute authority restrains the excessive ambition and corruption of the powerful. This idea is supported by the example of Tuscany, where for a long time three republics—Florence, Siena, and Lucca—existed over a relatively small territory. Although the other states of Tuscany are in a sense subservient to them, it is evident from their spirit and their institutions that they maintain, or at least would like to maintain, their liberty. This has come about because in Tuscany there is no lord of the castle and very few if any gentlemen, but rather the kind of equality that would enable a ruler with foresight and some knowledge of ancient civilizations to introduce civic life. Yet the ill fortune of Tuscany itself has been so great that up to our times this task has fallen to no man who has known how to do this, or has been able to accomplish it.

It is therefore possible to draw the following conclusions from this discourse: He who wishes to set up a republic in a state that has many gentlemen cannot do so unless he first eliminates them all, and he who wishes to set up a kingdom or principality where there is great equality cannot do so unless he raises many of the restless and ambitious spirits out of that equality and makes them gentlemen in fact and not just in name, giving them castles and possessions and favoring them with property and men. Placed in their midst, the new ruler will then maintain his power, while they, through him, will satisfy their ambitions. The rest of the citizenry can be compelled to bear the yoke that force and force alone will make them bear. With this method there will be a balance between the citizenry who oppress and the citizenry who are oppressed, and so all men will remain within their rank. Turning a state suited to be a kingdom into a republic, or one suited to be a republic into a kingdom, is a task for a man of rare intellect and power: Many have tried but few have succeeded. The magnitude of the task partly bewilders and partly hinders them, so that they inevitably fail in the very first stages of their attempt.

My argument that one cannot set up a republic where there are gentlemen might appear to be challenged by the example of the Venetian Republic, in which only gentlemen have any standing. My only reply to this is that the Venetian example does not conflict with what I have said, because the gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen in name more than in actuality, as they do not draw great revenues from their possessions. Their great wealth is founded on commerce and trade. What is more, none of these gentlemen owns a castle or has any jurisdiction over others. In Venice, the appellation of “gentleman” is one of dignity and rank and without any of the characteristics associated with gentlemen in other states. Just as the citizenry of all republics are divided into various appellations, so is Venice divided between gentlemen and commoners. Venetian gentlemen hold or can hold any office, while commoners are entirely excluded. This, however, does not create unrest in Venice, for reasons that I have already discussed.¹⁴² Thus you can found a republic where great equality exists or has existed, or set up a principality where there is great inequality. Otherwise you will create a system that lacks balance and will not endure.¹⁴³

138. In chapters 16–18 above.

139. Livy writes (Book V, chapter 21) that before setting out to conquer Veii, Camillus had sworn to give Apollo one-tenth of the plunder, should he be successful.

140. Livy writes (Book V, chapter 25) that it was decided that as Rome had gained the territories of Veii, one-tenth of their worth would be estimated and the money taken from the treasury. “But when it turned out that the money was not enough […] the matrons brought jewelry to the treasury.”

141. On the freedom of German cities see also The Prince, chapter 10, titled “Of How the Strength of Principalities Is to Be Measured.”

142. See chapters 5 and 6 above.

143. Machiavelli means a system that will lack proportion between those who rule and those who are ruled.