CHAPTER FORTY-SIX
ON HOW MEN PROGRESS FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND HOW THEY SEEK TO AVOID BEING HARMED BUT READILY HARM OTHERS

Once the Roman populace had regained its liberty¹²¹ and become as it had been before—except that now the populace was in an even better position, as it had created many new laws guaranteeing its own power—it seemed reasonable to expect that within a short period calm would be restored. But quite the opposite happened, with new turmoil and discord breaking out every day. Livy cogently points out the reason for this, so it seems fitting to use his exact words when he says that either the populace or the nobility always became insolent when the other was humiliated: When the plebeians were happy enough to remain quietly within their station, young noblemen took to attacking them. Nor could the tribunes take any measures as they too were under attack. The nobility, on the other hand, even though they thought their young men too violent, still felt that if the line was to be crossed it should be by their faction and not by the plebeians.¹²² And so in its desire to defend its own liberty each faction strove to oppress the other, because men in their quest to live without fear will attempt to instill fear in others. The harm they dispel they impose on others, as if the only way to prevail is either to harm or be harmed. Here can be seen one of the ways in which republics disintegrate, and how men progress from one ambition to another. The words that Sallust puts in Caesar’s mouth are very true: “For all bad examples arise from good beginnings.”¹²³ As I have already mentioned, the first thing a ruthlessly ambitious citizen of a republic will seek to do is guard himself from being harmed, not only by private citizens, but by magistrates as well. To do this he will seek allies, which he acquires by means that appear honest enough, either by offering money or by offering to defend the allies from those in power. This seems honest, so it easily fools everyone and is not remedied. Soon enough the ambitious citizen, continuing along his course without encountering any obstacles, reaches a position where private citizens are afraid of him and magistrates respect him. And once he has attained this position, he is at a point where it is extremely dangerous to counter him. I have already discussed the danger of trying to deal with a problem within a state when the problem has grown too great:¹²⁴ In a nutshell, one must seek either to eliminate it and run the danger of immediate ruin, or let it run its course and feign servitude until a death or some other incident frees you. Once citizens and magistrates are frightened of offending the powerful man and his allies, he does not have to do much more to have the magistrates pass rulings or attack others as he dictates. Consequently, a state must have institutions and laws that will hinder a citizen from doing evil under the guise of doing good, thus ensuring that he can develop only the kind of standing that will benefit and not harm liberty, as will be discussed in its proper place.

121. In 449 BCE, when the Decemvirs were forced to abdicate.

122. Machiavelli is quoting Livy, Book III, chapter 65.

123. Machiavelli quotes Bellum Catilinae, 51, 27, in Latin: in Latin: Quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt. Regarding Bellum Catilinae, see note 250 to Book III, chapter 6, below.

124. In chapter 33 above, titled “When a Problem Within a State or Against a State Has Grown, It Is Better to Bide One’s Time Than to Tackle It with Full Force.”