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For an extended discussion of ‘malformed’ emotions, see, for example, R.
Wollheim, On the Emotions, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1999.
38 For some reason, the authors of the numerous articles about ‘postmodern education’, in which education journals, unhappily, abound of late, tend to turn a blind eye to those paradoxes.
39 L. Kohlberg, ‘From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalist Fallacy and Get Away with It’, in T. Mischel (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology, New York, Academic Press, 1971, p. 227.
40 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 208 (1155a). Recall here my earlier discussion in s. 2.1.
41 Cited in W. Damon, ‘The Moral Development of Children’, Scientific American, August 1999, pp. 58, 60. For a more detailed discussion, see ch. 2 of W. Damon, The Moral Child: Nurturing Children’s Natural Moral Growth, New York, Free Press, 1988.
42 Damon, ‘The Moral Development of Children’, p. 62. Cp. the sad moral pessimism inherent in recent (‘postmodern’) misgivings about the existence of such a common ground; see, for example, various articles in A. Molnar (ed.), The Construction of Children’s Character. 96th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, II, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, s. 4: Critics of Character Education.
43 On the notion of ‘emotional expertise’, see Mayer and Salovey, ‘Emotional Intelligence and the Construction and Regulation of Feelings’, esp. pp. 205–6.
44 See, for example, M. Downey and A. V. Kelly, Moral Education: Theory and Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1978, p. 156; Beck and Kosnik, ‘Caring for the Emotions’, p. 165; D. Carr, Educating the Virtues: An Essay on the Philosophical Psychology of Moral Development and Education, London/New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 254–5; D. Carr, ‘After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development’, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1996, vol. 15, p. 367.
45 Cited in Pritchard, Reasonable Children, p. 90.
46 Guðrún Alda Harðardóttir (personal correspondence).
47 M. R. Lepper and D. Greene, ‘Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Rewards: A Test of the Overjustification Hypothesis’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, vol. 28. See also D. Putman, ‘The Primacy of Virtue in Children’s Moral Development’, Journal of Moral Education, 1995, vol. 24.
48 Damon, ‘The Moral Development of Children’, p. 61.
49 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, London, J. M.
Dent, 1931, p. 9.
50 Much of the discussion to be found in L. Kohlberg’s own work, Essays on Moral Development, I–III, New York, Harper Row, 1981, seems to me more nuanced than those bare results which typically have entered textbooks and teachers’ manuals. However, since my exploration here is not primarily expository, we can make do with the more historically important Kohlberg, namely the ‘Kohlberg’ of textbook fame.
51 I borrow this term from Pritchard who defines himself as a ‘hopist’ on the moral reasonableness of children; Reasonable Children, p. ix.
52 Ch. 5 in G. B. Matthews, The Philosophy of Childhood, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994, is particularly enlightening here.
53 See, for example, Carr, Educating the Virtues, p. 166.
54 For this criticism, see, for example, Pritchard, Reasonable Children, p. 129; Carr, Educating the Virtues, pp. 164ff; Carr, ‘After Kohlberg’.
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55 See D. Carr, ‘Cross Questions and Crooked Answers: Contemporary Problems of Moral Education, in J. M. Halstead and T. H. McLaughlin (eds) Education in Morality, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 41 (footnote 12). These feminist misgivings were most famously expressed by C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982.
56 After having taught at various levels of the educational system, from junior high school to university, my experience is that, in moral matters, ‘what is sauce for the [female] goose is also sauce for the gander’. When it comes, for example, to sexual jealousy, research does not indicate that men are from Mars and women from Venus; cross-cultural studies show that men and women in different cultures report virtually identical levels of such jealousy; cited in D.
M. Buss, The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy Is as Necessary as Love and Sex, New York, Free Press, 2000, pp. 49–50.
57 See, for example, Damon, ‘The Moral Development of Children’, pp. 58–59; Pritchard, Reasonable Children, pp. 127–8. For recent findings in developmental psychology about children’s early development of emotional self-agency, see Sherman, ‘Taking Responsibility for Our Emotions’.
58 Carr, Educating the Virtues, p. 8.
59 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 40 (1105b).
60 L. J. Walker, ‘The Family Context for Moral Development’, Journal of Moral Education, 1999, vol. 28, p. 264. I particularly recommend Walker’s essay here, as indeed the entire September 1999 issue of Journal of Moral Education, to which Walker’s piece serves as an introduction. This issue, devoted to moral education and family life, offers a welcome antidote to the typical scholarly lack of engagement with parental influence on children’s early character formation.
61 Cp. on the one hand Sherman’s Aristotelian account, ‘The Role of Emotions in Aristotelian Virtue’, p. 25, and on the other Goleman’s treatment of contemporary research; Emotional Intelligence, p. 114.
62 See D. Baumrind, ‘Current Patterns of Parental Authority’, Developmental Psychology Monograph, 1971, vol. 4, and various subsequent papers that she has written.
63 See, for example, S. Aðalbjarnardóttir and L. G. Hafsteinsson,
‘Tóbaksreykingar reykvískra ungmenna. Tengsl við uppeldishætti foreldra og reykingar foreldra og vina’, Uppeldi og menntun, 1998, vol. 7.
64 Admittedly, permissive parents are caring and warm-hearted, and they do nurture their children’s emotions much more than authoritarian or rejective-neglecting parents. However, the problem is that the clear and consistent rules are missing.
65 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 294 (1180a).
66 See ibid., p. 295 (1180b).
67 For the idea of the school as a ‘value preserve’, see M. Nisan, ‘Personal Identity and Education for the Desirable’, Journal of Moral Education, 1996, vol. 25.
68 Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 240.
69 On the power of ‘bootstrapping’, see de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, p.
11.
70 Damon, The Moral Child, p. 152.
71 Carr, Educating the Virtues, p. 12. Cp. Noddings’, Caring, with its emphasis on modelling as part of caring, for her the key to all moral education; students are stimulated to develop a caring attitude by the teacher’s caring for them.
72 In Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations.
73 The obfuscating role of ‘self-understanding’ in some popular psychological theories and everyday discourse (where all kinds of personal and moral progress tends to be referred to as ‘self-understanding’) is another story.
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74 For this example, see Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 230.
75 R. C. Roberts, ‘What an Emotion Is: A Sketch’, Philosophical Review, 1988, vol.
97, p. 193.
76 Carr, Educating the Virtues, p. 9.
77 No one has emphasised this point as well and forcefully as Martha Nussbaum in various writings; recall, for example, her view about the story-dependent specification of our common humanity described in s. 2.1.
78 For a refreshing reminder of these old and simple truths, see C. H. Sommers,
‘Teaching the Virtues’, The Public Interest, 1993, vol. 111.
79 C. S. Brodie, ‘Experiencing Emotions’, School Library Media Activities Monthly, 1996, vol. 12, provides a helpful list of books arranged according to the different emotions highlighted in the respective stories, and she also suggests some clever book-extension ideas.
80 See, for example, Damon, ‘The Moral Development of Children’, p. 61.
81 The method of a ‘sharing circle’ is explained and exemplified in D. Schilling, 50
Activities for Teaching Emotional Intelligence. Level II: Middle School, Spring Valley, CA, Innerchoice Publishing, 1996.
82 On the discursive foundation of self-respect, see P. C. Guin, ‘A Normative Conception of
Self-Esteem’, Bulletin of
the International Council for
Philosophical Inquiry with Children, 1993, vol. 8. Notably, Guin refers to what I call ‘self-respect’ as ‘normative self-esteem’; one more indication of the terminological confusion abroad in the literature, already brought home to us in s. 3.1.
83 M. Lipman, Thinking in Education, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 15.
84 M. Lipman, ‘Using Philosophy to Educate Emotions’, Analytic Teaching, 1995, vol. 15. Admittedly, the competition is not great.
85 Ibid., p. 4.
86 Recall here my mention, in s. 1.4, of the pedagogical value of prejudice.
87 Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, in R. McKeon (ed.) The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York, Random House, 1941, pp. 1309–16 (1339a-1342b). For an interpretation, see, for example, Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, pp.
90–1; G. Verbeke, Moral Education in Aristotle, Washington, DC, Catholic University of America Press, 1990, p. 20.
88 See C. Cottom, ‘A Bold Experiment in Teaching Values’, Educational Leadership, 1996, vol. 53.
89 Ibid., p. 55.
90 For a truly comprehensive view of moral education, both as a far as eclectic methods and diverse contents (not only moral knowledge and action, but also emotions) are concerned, see T. Lickona, ‘Educating for Character: A Comprehensive Approach’, in A. Molnar (ed.) The Construction of Children’s Character. 96th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, II, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997.
91 The City Montessori School runs its own teacher-training programme.
92 For similar advice, see Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 312.
93 J. Deigh, ‘Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions’, Ethics, 1994, vol. 104, p. 851.
94 For a down-to-earth account of the practical demands of moral education, see E. L. Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1986, pp. 166ff.
95 Similar considerations, relating to anger as a potential virtue, can be found in J.
Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 56.
96 D. Tombs, ‘ “Shame” as a Neglected Value in Schooling’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 1995, vol. 29.
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97 S. A. Bers and J. Rodin, ‘Social-Comparison Jealousy: A Developmental and Motivational Study’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1984, vol. 47.
98 S. Frankel and I. Sherick, ‘Observations on the Development of Normal Envy’, Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1977, vol. 32, suggest such an interpretation from a psychological perspective.
99 Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 324.
100 See J. Nubiola, ‘Emancipación, Magnanimidad Y Mujeres’, Anuario Filosófico, 1994, vol. 27.
101 Here Ben-Ze’ev for once agrees; The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 527.
102 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, pp. 163ff. (1389a–b).
103 For a parallel point concerning the elimination of irrational sibling jealousy, see Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 300.
104 R. de Sousa, ‘Emotions, Education and Time’, Metaphilosophy, 1990, vol. 21, p. 446.
105 See, for example, Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 231.
106 R. S. Dillon, ‘Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political’, Ethics, 1997, vol. 107, p. 249.
107 On the manner (as distinct from personality style and teaching method ) in which teachers display or fail to display the Aristotelian virtues (including megalopsychia and hence, arguably, pridefulness) in relations with their pupils, and how this may be observed and described, see C. Fallona, ‘Manner in Teaching: A Study in Observing and Interpreting Teachers’ Moral Values’, Teaching and Teacher Education, 2000, vol. 16. Cp. D. T. Hansen, ‘The Moral Importance of Teacher Style’, Journal of Curriculum Studies, 1993, vol. 25.
108 This exercise is loosely based on one in Schilling, 50 Activities for Teaching Emotional Intelligence, p. 76.
109 For a fuller ‘deconstruction’ of innocence as a moral notion; see E. Wolgast,
‘Innocence’, Philosophy, 1993, vol. 68.
110 A. Breton, Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. R. Seaver and H. R. Lane, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1969, p. 40.
111 J.-J. Rousseau, Émile, trans. B. Foxley, London, Dent, 1974.
112 See, for example, Verbeke, Moral Education in Aristotle, on Aristotle’s anthropological background.
113 See also T. Smith, ‘The Practice of Pride’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 1998, vol. 15, p. 80.
114 See M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 1996, vol. 13, for a further elaboration, where she draws on ideas from thinkers as distinct as Aristotle and Rousseau to press home her point about inter-human identification as the foundation of compassion.
115 F. Nietzsche, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ in Untimely Meditations, and Human, All Too Human, II, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
116 See, for example, S. Aðalbjarnardóttir, ‘Tracing the Developmental Processes of Teachers and Students: A Sociomoral Approach in School’, Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 1999, vol. 43, p. 62.
117 Carr, Educating the Virtues, p. 10.
118 F. K. Oser, ‘Morality in Professional Action: A Discourse Approach for Teaching’, in F. K. Oser, A. Dick and J.-L. Patry (eds) Effective and Responsible Teaching: The New Synthesis, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publ., 1992.
119 See M.-F. Daniel, ‘P4C in Preservice Teacher Education: Difficulties and Successes Encountered in Two Research Projects’, Analytic Teaching, 1998, vol. 19.
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120 For these and other no-nonsense suggestions about teacher training in morality, see Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, pp. 172–174.
7 Concluding remarks
1 Recall my arguments against the authority of the phronimos in s. 2.2.
2 A. Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2000, p. 164.
3 Ibid., pp. 167–8.
4 M. Power and T. Dalgleish do so, for example, without much ado; Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder, Hove, East Sussex, Psychology Press, 1997, pp. 38ff.
5 D. M. Buss, The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy Is as Necessary as Love and Sex, New York, Free Press, 2000, esp. pp. 1, 6, 21, 36, 162, and 225.
6 See, for example, Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, p. 533.
7 In rare cases a non-person; see s. 5.1.
8 Two caveats: First, I am speaking here from a moral point of view. A negative emotion may at times possess some other kind of value, witness for instance the aesthetic value of Schadenfreude in comedy. Interestingly, J. Portmann, When Bad Things Happen to Other People, New York/London, Routledge, 2000, suggests that even in comedy, there is indirect moral exploration at work as comedy allows us to try out morally ambiguous attitudes towards other people without really knowing where those attitudes will lead. Second, I am, of course, talking about emotions for which responsibility can be at least partly imputed to the agent; otherwise, the expression ‘negative’ will be out of place (see s. 1.4).
9 For the origin of this and other citations from Stephansson’s poetry, see K.
Kristjánsson, ‘Stephan G. Stephansson: A Philosophical Poet, a Poetic Philosopher’, Canadian Ethnic Studies, 1997, vol. 29. Cp. my defence of moral naturalism in s. 2.3 and my discussion of the moral ‘myth of the given’ in s. 6.4.
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252
I N D E X
Aðalbjarnardóttir, S. 235, 238, 240
behaviourism see emotion(s): behaviour Adams, R. M. 38–40
theory of
Ainslie, D. C. 228
Benn, S. 224
Allen, W. 93
Ben-Ze’ev, A. 4–5, 15, 17, 23–4, 26–8,
Alston, W. P. 212
35, 45–6, 80, 107–8, 114, 131–2, 143,
ancient morality 21, 111–13, 115–16,
146, 150–1, 153–5, 159, 167, 189, 197,
122, 128, 134
206, 211, 213–17, 223, 226, 229,
Anderson, H. C. 116
232–6, 238–41
Andersson, T. M. 229
Berenson, F. 169, 234
anger 8, 10–16, 18–19, 24–5, 30–1, 34,
Bers, S. A. 197, 199, 232–3, 240
36–7, 39, 41–4, 47, 58, 64, 80, 106,
Bloom, H. 233
137, 141–5, 150–1, 153–4, 160, 162–4,
Bourdieu, P. 228
166–7, 169, 210; see also envy: as
Boxill, B. R. 164, 234
angry
bravery see courage
Anscombe, G. E. M. 25–9, 66–7, 87, 89,
Brecht, B. 122
Brennan, S. 224
214, 221, 224
Breslau, K. 231
Aquinas, St Thomas 163, 167, 234
Breton, A. 200–1, 240
Aristotelianism see Aristotle
Brickhouse, T. C. 236
Aristotle 3, 5–6, 18–20, 22–3, 31, 38, 41,
Bringle, R. G. 231
49, 52–7, 62–3, 69, 71–4, 76, 79, 85–7,
Brink, D. O. 224
89, 91, 99–105, 110–13, 115, 117,
Brodie, C. S. 239
119–34, 139, 142–3, 153, 155, 161–7,
Buss, D. M. 159–60, 207–8, 232–3, 238,
172–5, 177–80, 182, 184, 188–9, 194,
241
196, 198, 201, 205–6, 211, 222–31,
233–40
Calhoun, C. 16–17, 30–1, 46, 212–13, 217
Arnold, M. B. 215
Carr, D. 3, 187–8, 190–1, 203, 211, 220,
art 201–2; as part of moral education
237–40
176, 194, 199–200
Carter, I. 222
Atherton, J. M. 236
Casey, J. 2, 129, 211, 227–9, 234, 239
Averill, J. R. 36, 213, 216, 234
character education see moral education Christian ethics 41, 112–13, 119, 121,
Baier, A. 17–18, 213
130–1
Bain, A. 80, 83, 97, 115, 162, 175, 221,
compassion 8, 19, 21, 28–9, 40, 46–7, 50,
225–6, 233, 236
52, 60, 76, 78–80, 169, 180, 182,
Barthes, R. 57–8
185–6, 190, 202–3
Baudrillard, J. 57
concepts see methodology
Baumrind, D. 188, 238
Cordner, C. 227–8
Beck, C. 170, 235, 237
courage 19, 76, 127–9, 185
253
I N D E X
Cottom, C. 239
of 5, 18, 37, 41–5, 49, 187, 191, 196;
Crisp, R. 223
sensory theories of 9–13, 15, 18, 20;
Curzer, H. J. 102, 120, 131, 142–3, 225–30,
see also virtue ethics; utilitarianism 233
emotional intelligence 2, 170, 176–8,
194, 203
Dalgleish, T. 24, 32, 34, 211–12, 214, 216,
emulation 137, 139
241
envy 3, 6, 18, 25–6, 41, 47, 136–55, 163,
Damon, W. 181, 190, 237–9
167–8, 199; as admiring/emulative see
Daniel, M.-F. 240
emulation; as angry 138, 140–4, 151,
D’Arms, J. 42, 216, 232
155, 159; as indignant 138, 140, 145,
Deigh, J. 33–5, 196, 216, 239
154–5; as invidious 38, 138–41,
Demos, R. 216
143–4, 146, 151–5, 167, 172, 198, 209;
deontology 49–51, 63, 73, 205; see also
as jealous see jealousy
liberalism
equality 113, 130–5
Derrida, J. 57
eudaimonia see good: human
Descartes, R. 17, 59–60
extraordinary deeds see heroism
deserts: moral 101–2, 123, 142–7, 149,
152–5, 157–65, 167–8, 175, 197–8,
Fallona, C. 240
202, 207, 209
Farrell, D. M. 2, 140–1, 150–2, 157–8,
Dewey, J. 170, 234
211, 213, 217, 230–3
Dickens, C. 83
fear 8, 11, 19, 24, 31, 34, 36, 52, 58, 114,
dignity 91, 93, 105, 107, 119
176, 181, 191
Dillon, R. S. 33, 98, 198, 216, 224–5, 240
Foot, P. 26, 29, 65–8, 72, 74–6, 215, 221,
Dissanayake, E. 61, 220
223
Dostoeveksy, F. 3
fortune see moral luck
Downey, M. 237
Foster, H. 219
Durrenberger, E. P. 222
Foucault, M. 57
Frank, D. H. 234
egalitarianism see equality
Frankel, S. 240
Eliot, G. 78
Freud, S. 17, 32, 191
elitism 7, 87, 134, 202–3
Frost, R. 108
Elíasdóttir, Á. 235
emotion(s): and animals 34–6, 145; and
Gardner, H. 170, 178–9, 236
adaptation see emotion(s):
Gibbard, A. 214
evolutionary accounts of; basicness
Gilligan, C. 238
of 8, 24–6; behaviour theory of 9–10,
Goldie, P. 166, 215, 230, 232–3
12–13, 18, 20; and beliefs 14–18,
Goleman, D. 177, 236, 238–9
30–6, 81, 175–6; cognitive theories of
good: human 1, 6, 48, 51–6, 63, 71, 73, 76,
4–5, 9–10, 14–18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 33–5,
85–7, 91, 98–9, 112, 114, 116, 120, 136,
37, 158, 170, 172–3, 175–80, 187,
163, 165, 169, 172, 179–80, 205, 209
190–2; components of 5, 14–17,
Goodstein, L. 220
26–36; as compounds 8, 25, 142, 144,
Gordon, R. 216
151, 167–8; education of 3–4, 7, 53,
Graham, G. 218
61, 86, 170–204, 208–9; evolutionary
Greene, D. 237
accounts of 206–8; logicality of 14,
Griffiths, P. E. 214
42; moral fittingness of 41–5, 49, 80,
guilt 37, 108–9, 113, 115–16
187, 191, 196, 204; moral justification
guilt-societies 108
of 1, 3–6, 38, 41–5, 49, 53, 61, 63,
Guin, P. C. 239
80–1, 85, 157, 161–2, 175, 178, 196,
Gutmann, A. 218
205–8; as negative 1–2, 5, 7, 35, 45–8,
136, 143, 165, 196–7, 209–10; as
Hafsteinsson, L. G. 238
positive 5, 45–8, 165, 169; rationality
Halwani, R. 70, 222
254
I N D E X
Hansen, D. T. 240
Kenny, A. 221
Harðardóttir, G. A. 237
Kohlberg, L. 4, 62, 170, 184–7, 190, 220,
Hardie, W. F. R. 226
234, 237
Hare, R. M. 222
Kosnik, C. 170, 235, 237
Hare, S. 132, 229–30
Kövecses, Z. 225
Harvey, D. 220
Kovesi, J. 27–8, 215
Hebdige, D. 219
Kundera, M. 98, 157
hedonism see pleasure
Held, D. t. D. 226, 228
Lacan, J. 57
Heraclitus 3
Lange, C. G. 10
Herman, B. 218
Lepper, M. P. 237
heroism 6, 103, 113, 126–9, 203
liberalism 6, 49–57, 61–3, 76, 171, 178–80,
Hill, T. E., Jr 225
194, 205
honour 91, 93, 101–3, 105, 112, 119, 123,
Lickona, T. 239
126
Lipman, M. 192–4, 239
human nature 18, 53–5, 57, 60–2, 86–90,
Lloyd, R. 156, 231, 233
134, 180–1, 187
Locke, J. 50
Hume, D. 10–11, 97, 115, 117–18, 134,
love 4, 8, 34, 45, 47, 61, 77, 89–90, 156–61,
212, 225, 228
166, 190, 208
humility 6, 113, 130–5, 208
luck see moral luck
Hursthouse, R. 44, 68–71, 73–4, 76, 80,
Lyotard, J.-F. 57
217, 220–4
MacIntyre, A. 119, 219, 228
indignation 8, 25, 116, 137–45, 150–3,
Marx, K. 201
155, 160, 163–4, 167, 197; see also
Massey, S. J. 99, 225
envy: as indignant
Matthews, G. B. 192–3, 237
innocence 200–2
Mayer, J. D. 213, 236–7
integrity 6, 91–3, 99
Mead, G. H. 228
Irwin, T. 225
meanness 7, 166–7
megalopsychia 6, 76, 91, 99–106, 108,
Jacobson, D. 42, 216, 232
110–13, 117, 119–22, 126–32, 139,
James, W. 10, 212
166, 181, 198, 202, 205
Jameson, F. 57–9, 219
methodology 5, 9, 20–4, 185, 193
jealousy 1–10, 18, 23, 25, 28, 30, 35–7,
Michelangelo 174
42–4, 47–8, 56, 58, 61–2, 64–5, 68,
Mill, J. S. 7, 49, 77–80, 85–9, 163, 167,
75, 91, 106, 136–70, 173, 175, 187,
183, 205, 212, 223–4, 236–7
196–204, 207–10; as distinct from
Miller, W. I. 229
fear/suspicion 148–51, 166;
modern morality see modernity
education of 136, 196–204; moral
modernity 21, 57–8, 63, 104, 112–13,
justification of 4, 7, 44, 48, 52, 63–4,
115, 117–22, 129, 131, 134
136, 156, 161–9, 207–8; as
modesty 103, 130–5, 202
romantic/sexual 6, 137, 147–8, 153,
Molière 13
155–61,166
mood 9, 34
Jewett, J. L. 217
moral education 3–4, 51–2, 78, 112,
170–204, 208–9; doubts about 7, 170,
Kagan, S. 221
179–87, 209; see also emotion(s):
Kant, I. 50–1, 97, 109, 112, 117, 119, 121,
education of
130, 186, 218, 220
moral luck 6, 105, 113, 119–26, 202
Kapur, N. B. 223
motivation 26–9, 79, 82, 86, 106, 116,
Karasawa, K. 217
118, 149; and moral education 183–5
Kekes, J. 109, 116, 226–8
Mullen, P. E. 233
Kelly, A. V. 237
multiculturalism see pluralism
255
I N D E X
multiple intelligences see Gardner, H.
196–204; moral justification of 7, 48,
Munch, E. 58
52, 63, 110, 113–35; see also pride
primitivism see innocence
Nagel, T. 229
Pritchard, M. S. 235, 237
naturalism 6, 23–4, 48–9, 62–3, 87–90,
Pugmire, D. 221
117, 206; see also utilitarianism
Putman, D. 237
Neu, J. 2, 118, 125, 153, 211, 226, 228–33
Putnam, H. 88, 224
Nietzsche, F. 7, 57, 133, 171, 190, 203,
212, 219, 235, 238, 240
Rand, A. 228
Nisan, M. 238
Rawls, J. 50–1, 53, 56, 61, 95, 218–19
Noddings, N. 235, 238
relativism 18, 21, 51, 57, 59, 61–2, 93,
Novitz, D. 164, 234
179–81, 194; see also postmodernism
Nozick, R. 161, 233
responsibility 36–41, 80, 104, 119, 122–5,
Nubiola, J. 240
133, 154, 159, 171–4
Nussbaum, M. C. 5, 23, 28–9, 32, 49,
Rey, G. 212
53–6, 60, 62, 86–7, 180, 211–16,
Ridge, M. 229
218–20, 222–4, 228, 235–6, 239–40
righteous indignation see indignation
Nuyen, A. T. 133, 230
Roberts, R. C. 16–17, 23, 30–2, 191, 213,
216, 239
Rodin, J. 197, 199, 231–3, 240
Oakley, J. 37, 40–1, 81, 211, 216, 220, 223
role model see teacher: as a moral
Ockham, W. 31, 35
exemplar
Oliver, L. 13
Rorty, A. O. 20–2, 118, 213–14, 217, 228
Ortony, A. 153, 232
Rorty, R. 57, 200, 219
Orwell, G. 31
Rousseau, J.-J. 187, 201, 214, 240
Oser, F. K. 203, 240
Ryle, G. 212
Pálsson, G. 222
Sachs, D. 96, 105, 107, 109, 225–6
Parrott, W. G. 147–8, 231
saga morality 4, 113
personhood 1, 4, 6, 61, 91–2, 99, 117–18,
Salovey, P. 213, 231, 236–7
135–6, 163, 166, 169, 208, 210
Sandel, M. 218
philosophy-for-children (P4C) 192–4
Scarre, G. 97, 223, 225
Piaget, J. 4, 184
Schachter, S. 212
Pincoffs, E. L. 239, 241
Schadenfreude 46–7, 61, 82, 137, 142–3, Pindar 172
167, 207, 209
Pinta, E. R. 234
Schapiro, T. 224
Pitt-Rivers, J. 158
Schaps, E. 235
Plato 193–4, 222, 229, 237
Schilling, D. 239–40
pleasure 58, 77–9, 85–6, 88–9, 169
Schueler, G. F. 134, 230
pluralism 51–3, 57, 62, 171, 179, 181
Segal, H. 233
Portmann, J. 143, 231, 241
self-deception 21, 30–3, 42, 45, 143–4,
postmodernism 52–3, 57–62, 76, 180–1,
153–5, 176, 179, 191
194
self-esteem 93–8, 104–5, 108–9, 111–12,
Power, M. 24, 32, 34, 211–12, 214, 216,
161, 164, 198
241
self-respect 1, 6, 91, 93–9, 105, 107,
pride 1–9, 18, 36, 41–2, 46–8, 56, 58, 91,
109–12, 114, 116–18, 125, 134–6,
93, 104–10, 113–18, 122–30, 134,
161–5, 167, 169, 183, 192, 197–8, 208
161–6, 170, 173, 183, 189, 196–7, 199,
shame 6, 8–10, 33, 37, 106–10, 112–19,
204, 208–10; see also pridefulness
122, 124–5, 127, 129, 149–50, 161,
pridefulness 1–2, 4, 6–7, 9, 47, 91–2, 102,
163, 197
104–10, 113–36, 163, 165, 189–90,
shame-societies 6, 108–9, 116, 119
196–204, 208–9; education of
Sharpsteen, D. J. 215, 231
256
I N D E X
Sher, G. 218, 231
Tollefsen, C. 227
Sherick, I. 240
Tombs, D. 197, 227, 239
Sherman, N. 31, 174, 179, 215, 229, 235–6,
238–9
Upton, H. 73, 222–3
Sichel, B. A. 218
utilitarianism 5–6, 49–50, 63, 66, 69–91,
Sidgwick, H. 223
Simmons, J. C. 236
96–8, 113–15, 122, 133, 167, 205–7;
Simmons, S. 236
and detachment 82–4; and
Singer, J. 212
victimisation 81–2, 205
Skinner, B. F. 212
Slote, M. 222–3
Van Gogh, V. 58
Smith, R. H. 147–8, 154–5, 231–2
Van Sommers, P. 231, 233
Smith, T. 134, 227, 229–30, 240
Verbeke, G. 239–40
Socrates 29, 77, 128, 194
virtue ethics 5–6, 49, 63–79, 85, 87, 112,
Solomon, D. 220–1
Solomon, R. C. 9, 15, 19, 26, 28, 46, 173,
205; emotion/action-guiding
212–13, 216–17, 236
objection to 64–5, 67–77, 79; self-
Sommers, C. H. 239
centredness objection to 63–4, 72, 76,
de Sousa, R. 17–18, 41, 176, 213, 217,
79
234, 236, 238, 240
Von Wright, G. H. 220
Statman, D. 69, 222
Stein, N. L. 217
Waismann, F. 214
Stoicism 14–15, 197, 227
Walker, L. J. 188, 238
stories: the use of in moral education 54,
Wallach, J. R. 218
191–2
Stephansson, S. G. 3, 54–5, 209–11, 241
Warhol, A. 58
Stephenson, W. 168, 234
Weber, M. 95
Stocker, M. 47–8, 165, 217
West, C. 59, 220
Styron, W. 67
White, G. L. 233
Svavarsdóttir, S. 215
White, S. A. 224, 226
Swift, J. 8
Williams, B. 64, 115–16, 133–4, 220, 223,
227–30
Taylor, C. 218
Wittgenstein, L. 11, 16, 191, 212
Taylor, G. 2, 109–10, 115, 211, 217, 224–8,
Wolf, S. 86, 224
230–1, 233
Wolgast, E. 240
Taylor, R. 226
teacher: as a moral exemplar 190–1, 199,
Wollheim, R. 29, 213, 215, 236
203–4
Wreen, M. J. 148, 153, 230, 232
Telfer, E. 225, 234
Thomas, L. 217
Young, E. 160
257