The Aftermath
The reader should
keep in mind that the kind of protocol and hospitality described
here has evolved substantially in the decades since. Ironically,
the style of hospitality practiced by the early Communist leaders
was more comparable to that of the Chinese imperial tradition than
of contemporary practice, which is less elaborate, with fewer
toasts and a less effusive tone on the governmental side. What has
not changed significantly is the meticulous preparation, the
complexity of argumentation, the capacity for long-range planning,
and the subtle sense for the intangible.
Nixon’s visit to
China is one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about
a seminal change in international affairs. The reentry of China
into the global diplomatic game, and the increased strategic
options for the United States, gave a new vitality and flexibility
to the international system. Nixon’s visit was followed by
comparable visits by the leaders of other Western democracies and
Japan. The adoption of the anti-hegemony clauses in the Shanghai
Communiqué signified a de facto shift of alliances. Though at first
confined to Asia, the undertaking was expanded a year later to
include the rest of the world. Consultation between China and the
United States reached a level of intensity rare even among formal
allies.
For a few weeks,
there was a mood of exaltation. Many Americans greeted the China
initiative as enabling China to return to the community of nations
to which it originally belonged (which was true), and treated the
new state of affairs as a permanent feature of international
politics (which was not). Neither Nixon, by nature skeptical, nor I
forgot that the Chinese policies described in the earlier chapters
had been carried out with the same conviction as the current ones,
or that the leaders who greeted us so charmingly and elegantly had,
not too long ago, been equally insistent and plausible in their
diametrically different course. Nor could it be assumed that Mao—or
his successors—would jettison the convictions that had seen them
through a lifetime.
The direction of
Chinese policy in the future would be a composite of ideology and
national interest. What the opening to China accomplished was an
opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent
and to mitigate differences where they existed. At the time of the
rapprochement, the Soviet threat had provided an impetus, but the
deeper challenge was the need to establish a belief in cooperation
over the decades, so that a new generation of leaders would be
motivated by the same imperatives. And to foster the same kind of
evolution on the American side. The reward for Sino-American
rapprochement would not be a state of perpetual friendship or a
harmony of values, but a rebalancing of the global equilibrium that
would require constant tending and perhaps, in time, produce a
greater harmony of values.
In that process, each
side would be the guardian of its own interests. And each would
seek to use the other as a source of leverage in its relations with
Moscow. As Mao never tired of stressing, the world would not remain
static; contradiction and disequilibrium were a law of nature.
Reflecting this view, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central
Committee issued a document describing Nixon’s visit as an instance
of China “utilizing contradictions, dividing up enemies, and
enhancing ourselves.”46
Would the interests
of the two sides ever be truly congruent? Could they ever separate
them from prevalent ideologies sufficiently to avoid tumults of
conflicting emotions? Nixon’s visit to China had opened the door to
dealing with these challenges; they are with us still.