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Biden left Nantucket early on Sunday, November 29, for the White House, where he waited in the portico that connects the residence and the Oval Office. He was taking a chance because the president at times got mad at him when he pushed too hard.

When Obama came down from the residence and saw Biden, he started laughing.

“What you’re about to do is a presidential order,” Biden advised. It was not a continuation of the debate anymore. “This is not what you think. This is an order.” If he didn’t stick to those orders, there was no exit. Without them—and this was his main argument—“We’re locked into Vietnam.” It might not work, and by next December it might be clear. “You may get to the point where you’ve got to make a really tough goddamned decision, man.”

“I’m not signing on to a failure.” Obama said. “If what I proposed is not working, I’m not going to be like these other presidents and stick to it based upon my ego or my politics—my political security.”

“This is what I’m going to announce,” the president said, handing out copies of the six-page terms sheet at 5 P.M. In additional to Biden, Obama had brought in his military team of Gates, Mullen, Cartwright and Petraeus. Jones and Emanuel joined them in the Oval Office. Several seemed surprised to find the president had outlined the exact decisions in writing.

Obama allowed time for everyone to read it.

“There’s going to be a hard-and-fast 30,000-troop surge,” the president said. In December 2010—a year from then—there would be an NSC-led assessment to see what was working and what was not. “In July 2011, we’re going to begin to thin out,” he said. There would be a drawdown of forces.

Obama turned to Gates, “I agree we won’t know exactly what to do by December 2010. I will wait until July 2011 to determine only one thing though.” That would be the slope of the thinning out. He raised his hand high and with it drew the slope of an imaginary graph heading way down.

“In 2010 we will not be having a conversation of how to do more,” Obama added. There would be no repeat of what had happened that year. “I will not want to hear that we’re doing fine, Mr. President, but we’d be better if we just do more. We’re not going to be having a conversation about how to change … unless we’re talking about how to draw down faster than anticipated in 2011.”

This was a redefined mission, the president said, with a narrower focus. “This is neither counterinsurgency nor nation building. The costs are prohibitive.” Focus was to be on developing the Afghan government and security force capacity. This was designed to give Afghanistan a chance and provide McChrystal with new resources and some flexibility.

“It can’t be an open-ended nation building, unrealistic nation building endeavor,” he said. “It’s not a full-blown counterinsurgency strategy, but obviously has many elements of a counterinsurgency strategy.”

They would do annual targets for the increase of the Afghanistan security forces, not the 2013 target of 400,000 that McChrystal had requested. The president said he would not commit to the 400,000.

Turning to Petraeus, he said, “Don’t clear and hold what you cannot transfer. Don’t overextend us.

“This represents a strategic modification of what Stan drew from the Riedel report and the Strategic Implementation Plan.”

He was approving 30,000 U.S. troops plus 10 percent more or 3,000 which Gates could send if there were exceptional circumstances. “There won’t be universal applause on Capitol Hill,” he added. Everyone knew that the Democrats were going to be the biggest naysayers, and the Republicans the biggest supporters.

“Many of my political advisers will not be overly happy with this,” he said.

“There’s going to be tough, tough fighting in the spring and summer,” he added. “We anticipate a rise in casualties.”

If you have any personal misgivings or any professional doubts about what we’re about to do, tell me now, because I need to hear it, he said. “If you don’t think this is the right approach, say so now. The only alternative is just to go with trainers”—the 10,000 to 11,000 option that in the military’s judgment carried the most risk.

“Here’s what I need you to do,” the president continued. “I need you to tell me now whether you can accept this. And if you can’t, tell me right now. If you can, then I expect your wholehearted support. And that includes what you say in public, to Congress, and internally to your own organizations.”

Obama then turned to Mullen, who would be appearing before congressional committees soon. “When you go up and testify,” the president said, “you have an obligation to say what you think. I’m not asking you to change what you believe, but if you do not agree with me, say so now.”

There was a pause.

“Say so now,” the president repeated.

“I fully support, sir,” the chairman said, adding that “internal deliberations have been internal. Internal discussion wouldn’t be part of, certainly, the public record or anything.” None of them would speak about it. He seemed to be saying he had not leaked information about the strategy review sessions and would not testify about them. “Testimony will fully support what you’ve said here, Mr. President. You need not worry about this.” Mullen then complimented the decision. “This does give us a shot at turning things around.”

Petraeus had privately concluded that the terms sheet, though a little heavy-handed, was not just to get clarity, but to show the president was in control. When he later learned the president had personally dictated the orders, he couldn’t believe it. “There’s not a president in history that’s dictated five single-spaced pages in his life. That’s what the staff gets paid to do.”

However, the military was getting almost everything.

“We support you,” Petraeus said. “What matters is the sheer number of troops. We’ll do repackaging of forces to ensure three combat brigades in the package” even though some of the 4,500 enablers might have to come out of the 30,000. “We’re all now committed to this. We’ll do everything possible to get the troops on the ground as rapidly as possible and to enable, ultimately, the transfer to begin in July 2011.”

The general shifted into cheerleading mode. “We need to link arms now and pull forward.” He cited an editorial in one of the newspapers quoting a local Afghan leader saying that security is the mother of all development.

Petraeus recommended that the transition of security tasks to the Afghans be “conditions-based,” determined by what was happening on the ground, though he added, “I do think some transfer can take place by July 2011.” He also said, “We will push as rapidly as possible to deploy” and get the new forces there as fast as possible.

Next, Obama turned to Emanuel, who privately had called the war “political flypaper”—you get stuck to it and you can’t get unstuck.

The chief of staff said he was worried about the cost, noting that he had recently worked hard just to find a few hundred million dollars for an important program. “This could cost $30 billion” more, he said. “You know, this is a big deal.” He agreed they needed to stay linked together. “You’ve got to just go forward now,” he told the others, making it clear he was unhappy with the outcome. “Now, we’ve got a decision, and we’ve got to go forward.”

The president next asked Jones, who simply said he supported the decision.

Gates then said, “This came out about where I thought was right. What we laid out in late March, in retrospect, was too ambitious. The timelines are about right, in terms of the assessment”—December 2010 for a serious evaluation “and then beginning transition in summer 2011. We have a strong case … I’m sure Congress will support us.”

Biden said, “As I see it, this is not a negotiation. I fully support. I view this as an order from the commander in chief.” This was a mission change. “If this is not perceived as a change in mission, we cannot justify why we spent months working on this.

“The context for this is that this is necessary to defeat al Qaeda and support the effort in Pakistan. We can’t lose sight of Pakistan and stability there. The way I understand this, Afghanistan is a means to accomplish our top mission, which is to kill al Qaeda and secure Pakistan’s nukes. We must be making progress separately against al Qaeda and separately in Pakistan.”

Yes, the president agreed. The main pillar of this would be top secret and not be made public. That pillar was that safe havens for al Qaeda in Pakistan or elsewhere would no longer be acceptable. He was already expanding the mission against the main enemy and planned to intensify it with both the military and CIA. He wanted to send a message to Pakistan that the United States was committed, and address the real threat to the homeland and U.S. interests.

After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had developed the so-called Bush Doctrine that said in responding to terrorist attacks, “We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them.” Obama was not going to wait for an attack. They were going after the sanctuaries with a vengeance.

“Okay,” the president said, “the process has been very useful. This is an order. We’ll all be united.” He planned to unveil the new strategy on Tuesday night at West Point, he said.

Gates said, “You sound the bugle Tuesday night, Mr. President, and Mike”—the chairman—“and I will be the first to charge the hill.”

They all walked out of the Oval Office. Everyone seemed supportive. They were going along, but did anyone truly believe?

Unlike Lute, Donilon thought Gates had navigated the divide between Obama and the uniforms pretty well. The secretary of defense had to keep the trust, confidence and loyalty of the uniforms and balance that with the president’s vision. It looked as if Gates had been able to deliver unanimity and Obama would not have to deal with military leaders saying they couldn’t do it or, worse, have a bunch of resignations.

The president then went down to the Situation Room with Biden and Jones for a secure videoconference with McChrystal and Eikenberry to review the terms sheet, which had been sent to them.

“Gentlemen,” Obama began, “I want to be clear about what we are not doing. This is not a nationwide counterinsurgency strategy.” Such a strategy would not be sustainable with the American public, he said, it would break the budget, and it would leave the Afghan government more dependent on us. The cost of Stan’s plan might be up to $1 trillion.

“No way,” the president said.

We have to break the momentum of the Taliban, he said. The terms laid out in the sheet would give the time and space for the ANSF growth. “We need to send a message of resolve to the region.” But above all, he said, “We’re not making Afghanistan a long-term protectorate.

“The first reassessment will be in December 2010.” That would be used to reach a conclusion about the pace of thinning out forces the next year. “This assessment will not result in holding the numbers we now have or adding numbers. It will only be about the flexibility in how we draw down, not if we draw down.

“We are not going to do 400,000 [ANSF],” Obama said, “but we’ll train as many as possible. We still will have a big problem getting this through Congress.

“Everything is calibrated on us thinning out. … Stan, if this were 2003, maybe we could do a counterinsurgency strategy. Maybe I would have done that, but it’s 2009 and we’re long past that point.

“Even with a narrower mission and less resourcing, there is still no appetite here for us doing this. I hope you understand that. So there cannot be any dogfights between you, Petraeus, Mullen and Biden, and that includes you, Karl.” Addressing Eikenberry, he said, “If this is not the case, I will go with” the 11,000 trainers only. He said he wanted them to understand precisely what he was saying. “Messaging in the next two weeks is going to be critical.”

“Mr. President,” McChrystal said, “I think I’ve got it. But I need clarification on the size of the ANSF. Mr. President, what is the target? I need more clarity for the Afghans. They’re going to want to know what is the actual number.”

“You’ll give yearly goals for two years,” Obama said, “and keep working on developing the cost for the next decade for the Afghan National Security Forces.” Train as many as possible, he said. “I’m not going to micromanage this.” But there was no longer a target of 400,000.

Eikenberry said he fully supported the decisions but saw three risks—Pakistan, the Afghan forces and governance. “What kind of security guarantees can we offer beyond two years?” the ambassador asked.

The president asked the NSC staff to get talking points from McChrystal and Eikenberry that he could present to Karzai in a secure videoconference. Finally, he directed that the principals have a series of meetings to develop the strategic framework for relations with Pakistan.

As they all knew, the Pakistan problem was not just a matter of protecting the homeland and destroying al Qaeda. There was always the prize: bin Laden. “We’ve found the hornets’ nest,” Jones said later. “We’re poking at it from different ways. The bees are swarming but the queen is still there.”

That Monday morning, the president met with his White House national security staff. He had several changes to the draft of his speech and the tone was different from his secret orders. “The days of providing a blank check are over,” the speech said, but the reference was to Karzai and not the military.

He wanted a three-part argument: troops, civilian surge and Pakistan. There was nothing explicit about limiting the mission.

I went back and read Eisenhower’s famous farewell speech about the threat of the military-industrial complex, Obama said. The speech-writers had given him a copy in a packet as he was also preparing his Nobel acceptance speech.

He said everyone focuses on the military-industrial complex part, but to him the most interesting quote was Eisenhower’s statement about the need to find a reasonable equilibrium between defense needs and the other vital functions of government: “Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.”

“I want you to put that quote in the speech,” Obama told Rhodes. And he wanted to say that the loss of balance was one of the mistakes made in recent years. Military might and national security were dependent on the economy, which needed major attention.

Copies of the latest draft were sent to Clinton and Gates.

Robert Rangel, Gates’s Pentagon chief of staff, called Rhodes because the secretary was concerned about the rigid July 2011 date to begin withdrawing some forces. Gates wanted to make sure the decision to draw down was based on something. He proposed adding a phrase saying that any withdrawal would take into account “conditions on the ground.”

Rhodes went to Obama, who approved the change. That was what they had done in Iraq, and the president seemed to like the flexibility and the ambiguity.

Clinton, who had been at Karzai’s November 19 inaugural, wanted the speech to underscore a lasting commitment to both the Afghan and Pakistani people.

Obama agreed to add those points.

•   •   •

On the morning of Tuesday, December 1, before the speech, Jones repeated his lingering concerns to an associate in his office. He was still worried that they had not evaluated the 33,000 already ordered in by Bush and Obama. “One of the weaknesses in the demand, I think, for more troops, was we got 33,000 flowing in there this year and no real assessment yet as to how the hell they’re doing.”

It had been a real roller coaster, Jones felt. “It was raw,” he said. “There were some raw emotions out there.

“It just frayed. There are people here whose background is politics, so they look at everything in political terms. … The hard part was to not let the political interpretation of everything we decide drive the train: If you can’t sell it politically, you can’t do it.”

“We’re going to get our asses kicked for a while here,” Axelrod said six hours before the speech. “There’s going to be a lot of turmoil politically around this. We’ve got to strap on our armor here.”

Biden believed the president had put a stake in the heart of expansive counterinsurgency. His orders, in Biden’s view, formed a new strategy to stabilize Afghan population centers, such as Kabul and Kandahar, to prevent the Taliban from being able to topple the Karzai government. The military felt they had outsmarted the president and had won, but he believed that the president had prevailed.

Petraeus saw it differently. Counterinsurgency was alive and well. The core of the decision was 30,000 troops to protect the population. All the issues about what the strategy wasn’t—not fully-resourced COIN, not nation building—were just words. The reduction from 40,000 to 30,000 allowed the president to save face. It wasn’t ideal, but McChrystal could get 10,000 from NATO and other countries. If the president had told him at the beginning that it would come out with this strategy and 30,000 troops, Petraeus would have taken it in a second.

Petraeus said privately, “You have to recognize also that I don’t think you win this war. I think you keep fighting. It’s a little bit like Iraq, actually. Iraq is a bit of a metaphor for this. Yes, there has been enormous progress in Iraq. But there are still horrific attacks in Iraq, and you have to stay vigilant. You have to stay after it. This is the kind of fight we’re in for the rest of our lives and probably our kids’ lives.”

Perhaps the most pessimistic view came from Richard Holbrooke. “It can’t work,” he said.