25
At about 2:30 on Wednesday afternoon, November 25, the day before Thanksgiving, the president and his chief of staff met in the Oval Office with the White House national security team—Jones, Donilon, McDonough and Rhodes, the foreign policy speechwriter.
Obama said this was the most difficult decision he had faced—and he looked like it was.
He unspooled what was on his mind, offering some conclusions, expressing some uncertainty, and outlining specifics to Rhodes for the upcoming speech. He said he was “inclined to go with the 30,000” troops, yet he didn’t sound like this was final.
“This needs to be a plan about how we’re going to hand it off and get out of Afghanistan,” Obama said. “Everything that we’re doing has to be focused on how we’re going to get to the point where we can reduce our footprint. It’s in our national security interest. There cannot be any wiggle room. It has to be clear that this is what we’re doing.”
There were uncertainties, he said. “As we describe this to the American people, they’re not as interested in things like the numbers of brigades. It’s the number of troops. And I’ve decided on 30,000.” It was the lowest number in Gates’s Option 2A, which had been submitted three weeks earlier. Obama now sounded more certain on that number. “We should make clear that this is not the Iraq debate. We’re not talking about setting a date for removing our troops and lessening our commitment. We’re talking about identifying the time frame for transition” to the Afghan security forces.
“And we also need to make clear that we’re going to have interests in Afghanistan that are enduring, in terms of counterterrorism and governance, assistance.” Focus on training also, he said. “I want to emphasize the speed with which we’re doing things. Faster in, faster out.”
In an unusual move, he said, “I want everybody to sign on to this—McChrystal, Petraeus, Gates, Mullen, Eikenberry and Clinton. We should get this on paper and on the record.” With the president speaking as if there would be a signed contract, some had the mistaken impression that he wanted actual signatures on a document.
“We’re not going to be precise about the speed with which we’re winding down,” Obama said. They would just identify the point of transition—July 2011. In a shot right at Petraeus, he said, “Avoid the counterinsurgency language in public.” The language he wanted to use was “target, train and transfer.”
He reiterated that he was out-of-hand rejecting the McChrystal proposal to train the Afghan security forces up to 400,000. “We’re not going to set targets unless we’re going to meet them.” He added that on the price tag, “We shouldn’t low-ball the price in our estimates. We should be as clear as we can, when we can, about how much this is going to cost.
“We shouldn’t be belligerent in how we talk about this,” said Obama, who had been offended by Bush’s “bring ’em on” talk and the early Bush rhetoric of getting bin Laden “dead or alive.” He added, “We need to set public expectations that this is going to be difficult and it’s going to take time.”
Donilon asked about Pakistan. Exactly how were they going to explain that the safe havens there would no longer be acceptable? It could not be framed as a declaration of war inside Pakistan. This was a tricky problem.
“We need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan,” Obama said. “The reason we’re doing the target, train and transfer in Afghanistan is so the cancer doesn’t spread there. We also need to excise the cancer in Pakistan.” But the fuller explanation would not—could not—be in the speech because these were covert drone attacks and other clandestine operations. “We also have to connect this to our counterterrorism efforts in the homeland.”
Turning to the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, he said they had to make it clear they “are both supportive of this and will get into the fight. That this is an opportunity for them to increase their partnership.”
Obama said the speech should address the underlying purpose of these decisions. “The reason we’re doing this is to create the space for the training and partnership with the Afghans to work.” It was a surge intended to get the United States out.
Donilon said that not everything was resolved. The Pentagon was now raising another troop request that had been overlooked during the deliberations. It was for 4,500 more “enablers”—logistics, communications and medical personnel—and it had been pending since summer. As best he could tell, some of those enabling functions were built into the request for the large brigades. I’m not impressed that they have made a good, strong case that these 4,500 enablers are necessary for those brigades, Donilon said.
“That’s basically taking it up to 40,000?” the president asked.
“Yes.”
“I’m done doing this!” Obama said, finally erupting. “We’ve all agreed on a plan. And we’re all going to stick to that plan. I haven’t agreed to anything beyond that.”
The 30,000 was a “hard cap,” he said forcefully. “I don’t want enablers to be used as wiggle room. The easy thing for me to do—politically—would actually be to say no” to the 30,000. Then he gestured out the Oval Office windows, across the Potomac, in the direction of the Pentagon. Referring to Gates and the uniformed military, he said, “They think it’s the opposite. I’d be perfectly happy—” He stopped mid-sentence. “Nothing would make Rahm happier than if I said no to the 30,000.”
There was some subdued laughter.
“Rahm would tell me it’d be much easier to do what I want to do by saying no,” the president said. He could then focus on the domestic agenda that he wanted to be the heart of his presidency. The military did not understand. “Politically, what these guys don’t get is it’d be a lot easier for me to go out and give a speech saying, ‘You know what? The American people are sick of this war, and we’re going to put in 10,000 trainers because that’s how we’re going to get out of there.’
“And the military would be upset about it,” the president added.
It was apparent that a part—perhaps a large part—of Obama wanted to give precisely that speech. He seemed to be road-testing it.
Donilon said that Gates might resign if the decision was only the 10,000 trainers.
“That would be the difficult part,” Obama said, “because Bob Gates is … there’s no stronger member of my national security team.”
No one said anything more about that possibility.
“I’m just going to lay it out,” the president said, returning to the path they had supposedly agreed on for the 30,000. Overall, he said there were five points he wanted to underscore for how they all would talk about the decision.
“We need to emphasize this is an international effort,” he said. “We need to emphasize we’re getting troops in faster and getting them out faster. We need to emphasize the training of the Afghans. We need to emphasize the need to beat back the Taliban’s momentum, and we need to emphasize that this will help us improve Afghan governance.”
The speech “should be very sober but not depressing.” He said again that he didn’t want to use the word “counterinsurgency,” but just talk instead about security for the Afghan population centers. The terms counterinsurgency and counterterrorism had become caricatured, he felt, code words for nationwide security versus pulling back and firing missiles from ships and drones.
Full counterinsurgency was not possible, yet it had become a Republican mantra. “Here’s the part of it that I agree with,” he said. “In order to have successful training of these security forces and to blunt the Taliban’s momentum, you need to secure enough population centers to create space for that training mission to succeed.”
He repeated that he wanted a decision memorandum that everyone would have to follow.
“We’re not going to do this unless everybody literally signs on to it and looks me in the eye and tells me that they’re for it.” The president was as animated as most in the room had ever seen him. “I don’t want to have anybody going out the day after and saying that they don’t agree with this.” No more gentlemen’s agreements. The lawyer in Obama would attempt to deter revisionism with a written document.
Addressing Rhodes, he began to sketch the case he wanted to make in his speech.
“We need to remind people why we went into Afghanistan in the first place,” he said. “We need to tell the story of how we got up to where we are today. I want to make the point that this is the epicenter of violent extremism.” The speech should describe how he believed in the mission in Afghanistan and the need for additional resources.
“People think that this is some kind of numbers game,” the president said. He repeated what he had said two weeks earlier during a review session. If I was not convinced this was necessary, he said, “going to Dover, another night in Dover, would be enough for me to just say the hell with this, and let’s get out of there.” A version of that should be in the speech, Obama said, to show it had been hard to make this decision, and how deep his conviction was.
The president also wanted to stress that an international coalition supported this war. It was not just an American war, and any increase in force would be accompanied by an increase from the NATO allies. He also said he had to be specific about the July 2011 date for beginning withdrawal.
Biden had suggested a long section on Pakistan, but they had to be careful. Much of that would be on the covert side and involved classified forces. All hell would break loose if the president announced that safe havens were no longer acceptable, and he was going after them with U.S. ground combat forces—Special Operations or CIA paramilitary teams. Crossing the border, even with Pakistani acquiescence, was dicey.
“You know what?” Obama said. He had outlined the Pakistan problem already in March. “We did that the first time. We’ve made it clear to people. They’ll link it, but this speech is about Afghanistan. Americans are really concerned about our troops in this speech.”
The president repeated that he had decided on the 30,000-troop option and that should be in the speech draft, he said, adding a caution. “There’s a chance the decision could change,” he said. “We may need another speech.”
Obama called Rhodes back to the Oval Office shortly after the meeting.
“One other thing,” the president said, “I want to say in the speech why this is not Vietnam, why this is not Iraq.” He wanted to say that in Afghanistan, unlike Vietnam, the United States had 41 nations supporting the war as coalition partners. And it would be useful to remind people that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by al Qaeda, which had sanctuary in Afghanistan. Tell the whole story from 9/11. It was not like Iraq because we weren’t attacked from there and there is no threat to the homeland from Iraq. Yet, he said he wanted to acknowledge that Iraq’s security and stability had improved.
Of both Vietnam and Iraq, he said, “We’ve had wrenching debates about these issues as a country. But we need to move beyond relitigating those debates. We need to celebrate the heroism and courage of our troops without glorifying war.
“We need to convey the extent of the threat and the fact that these dangers still exist,” he directed. The tone ought to be “clear-eyed and resolute with a clear focus on our interests, that we’ve not overexpanding or moving beyond those interests.
“Give it some lift that we’ve carried a special burden since the time of FDR. We have not always been lauded as a consequence. We’ve made some mistakes, but we’ve underwritten the architecture of national security with the service and sacrifice of our young men and women and our taxpayers.
“Extremism will be a long struggle,” he said. “In many ways, it’s more complicated than simply dealing with nation-states, because you’re dealing with disorderly regions.
“Our motivations are the same as they were over the last 60 years, which is that we don’t seek world domination or occupation.” He said he thought that the lives of our children and grandchildren would be better if other people’s children and grandchildren had better lives.
Expressing some frustration, he noted, “Our entire national policy can’t just be focused on terrorism.” There were 6 billion people in the world with a vast range and diversity of concerns, and we also had to be focused on our own economy because it’s the foundation of our strength in the world. “We can’t lose sight of that, and we have too much in recent years.”
Finally, the president added, “The American people are idealists, but they also want their leaders to be realistic. The speech has to convey that.”
Obama had met that week with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who was later quoted in The Washington Post as saying there was “serious unrest” among Democrats over the possibility of voting to spend billions more for the Afghanistan War. It was the most difficult vote she could ask her fellow Democrats to cast. On a conference call with bloggers, Pelosi said, “We need to know what the mission is, how this is further protecting the American people and is this the best way to do that, especially at a time when there’s such serious economic issues here at home.”
Later on Wednesday, Obama held his regular weekly meeting with Gates in the Oval Office. The room is so well lit, bright with no shadows, that it has a stark feeling. It is assuredly a setting for business.
Everything was winding down for the Thanksgiving holiday. They had completed nine often grueling sessions on the strategy review, and it was clear to everyone, including Obama, that Gates needed some final decisions soon. Since Mullen was traveling to Geneva for an unannounced meeting on strategic arms reductions, Cartwright, the vice chairman, was attending in his place. Jones also joined.
The president said that he had arrived at the number. Under the redefined mission, he said, the best I can do is 30,000.
Cartwright was not surprised. It had a perfect symmetry—right between the McChrystal 40,000 and the hybrid 20,000. But it was also between the 35,000 that Gates had most recently been seeking, and the 25,000 that Cartwright had thought was about right.
Here is why it will be 30,000, the president added. The financially hard times were real, as they all knew. Obama said he wasn’t going to support an open-ended commitment. In addition, he was not going to do nation building or pursue a full counterinsurgency strategy. Already, he and Bush had committed 33,000 troops more in one year.
Jones was still amazed that the military had not provided a real assessment of how the hell those 33,000 were doing, and they still wanted another 40,000. A cynical person would think you can’t be serious. A cynical person, Jones thought, would say, “Whiskey Tango Foxtrot.”
The country would not support business as usual in Afghanistan, Obama said. “This is what I’m willing to take on, politically.” The very best was 30,000, he repeated.
Gates had worked for seven other presidents. Each had his own decision-making style. Assertions and conclusions were often floated, sometimes emphatically, sometimes tentatively. It wasn’t evident what this meant.
“I’ve got a request for 4,500 enablers sitting on my desk,” Gates said. The requests for force had been stacking up since September when they began the review. “And I’d like to have another 10 percent that I can send in, enablers or forces, if I need them. If I need mineclearing units or more medical personnel, support people.”
“Bob,” the president said, “30,000 plus 4,500 plus 10 percent of 30,000 is”—he had already done the math—“37,500.” Sounding like an auctioneer, he added, “I’m at 30,000.”
It was an extraordinary moment. He had never been quite so definitive or abrupt with Gates. When Obama spoke at the meetings, it had often been questions or summaries. “I’m at 30,000.
“I will give you some latitude within your 10 percentage points, things that you might need in the future,” but under exceptional circumstances only. “But I’m not getting to 37,500,” Obama said emphatically. “I might as well go to 40,000.”
“Can you support this?” Obama asked. “Because if the answer is no, I understand it and I’ll be happy to just authorize another 10,000 troops and we can continue to go as we are and train the Afghan national force and just hope for the best.”
“Hope for the best,” the condescending words hung in the air.
Gates said that he would support 30,000. Yes, he could go along.
Cartwright signed up as well. He realized that the president had given a shot across the bow—take it or leave it. Clearly, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs concluded, the president had picked 30,000 in order to keep the family together.
The auctioneer had closed the bidding. The president had decided.
As a Thanksgiving tradition, Biden and his family rented a house in Nantucket.
There was no good option that would guarantee success, the president told him by secure phone. “We were dealt a very bad hand,” Obama lamented again.
Biden said it would not be that bad if the Karzai government fell.
No, Obama said, the downside was too great, and he was going with 30,000.
Biden wrote a long-hand memo to the president. “It’s not the number, it’s the strategy,” he said, and sent it on secure fax to Obama. In the course of the holiday he faxed half a dozen handwritten memos to Obama, underscoring that theme and urging that the president incorporate five points into his final decision:
1. No full counterinsurgency;
2. No nation building;
3. Focus on al Qaeda;
4. The military can occupy only what they can transfer to the Afghans; and
5. The goal is to “degrade” the Taliban with eventual reconciliation in mind.
He also pressed Obama not to buy in to the extravagant goal of building a 400,000 Afghan security force.