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On September 29, at 1:30 P.M., Jones assembled the principals in the Situation Room for a two-hour discussion before the NSC meeting the next day. He called it a “rehearsal,” where they could sharpen their arguments and presentations without the president there. Jones thought several rambled, especially Biden and Holbrooke.

A video of the meeting would probably alarm anyone who watched. Eight years into the war, they were struggling to refine what the core objectives were.

Biden had written a six-page memo exclusively for the president questioning the intelligence reports about the Taliban. The reports portrayed the Taliban as the new al Qaeda. Because the Taliban was taking the fight to the Americans, it had become a brand that drew Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Chechens who ventured to Afghanistan for their so-called summer of jihad.

In his memo, Biden indicated that, based on the way he read the intelligence reports, the phenomenon was grossly exaggerated. There were perhaps 50 to 75 foreign fighters in Afghanistan at any given time. That was a magnitude of order below the thousands—including a 22-year-old Osama bin Laden—who had flooded the country after the Soviet occupation started in 1979. The vice president did not see evidence that the Pashtun Taliban projected a global jihadist ideology, let alone designs on the American homeland.

It had already appeared in the news that McChrystal was going to ask for about 40,000 troops. The number was being debated on live television before it was being discussed in the Situation Room.

At 3 P.M. on Wednesday, September 30, Obama sat down for the second meeting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review. This was a larger group than the first session, about 18 people. Petraeus was in attendance this time. It was clear to everyone in the White House that he had to be there because any decision reached without him would be suspect.

The media debate about Afghanistan had become polarized, a choice between a massive troop influx and a complete withdrawal.

“Is there anybody who thinks we ought to leave Afghanistan?” the president asked.

Everyone in the room was quiet. They looked at him. No one said anything.

“Okay,” he said, “now that we’ve dispensed with that, let’s get on.”

One note taker circled what he had written: “POTUS says take off the table the notion that we’re leaving Afghanistan.” POTUS is short for president of the United States.

But Obama also wanted to steer away from Afghanistan as best he could for the rest of the session.

“Let’s start where our interests take us, which is really Pakistan, not Afghanistan,” he said. “In fact, you can tell the Pakistani leaders, if you want to, that we’re not leaving” Afghanistan.

With that out of the way, Lavoy, the DNI’s deputy director for analysis, began his intelligence briefing, clarifying the dynamics between al Qaeda, now primarily in Pakistan, and the Taliban. Al Qaeda was the direct threat to the United States, Lavoy said.

The significance of the Taliban, added DNI Blair, was that it was an extremist movement allied to al Qaeda that was succeeding. Providing it was winning, the Taliban was happy to have al Qaeda at its side.

But it was vexing to distinguish perfectly among the Taliban, al Qaeda and other groups, Blair and Lavoy said. As McChrystal’s assessment had noted, the Haqqani network drew foreign money and manpower “from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups.” Its links with al Qaeda could foster an environment for other associated extremist movements “to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan.”

Al Qaeda would return to Afghanistan under two conditions, Lavoy said. The Taliban had to control the country again, or control areas beyond the reach of U.S. and NATO ground forces. And, the security situation in the ungoverned areas of the FATA in Pakistan would have to become too dangerous for al Qaeda. Despite the frequency and success of CIA drone attacks in the FATA and the Pakistani military taking actions against its own branch of the Taliban, there was no evidence that al Qaeda was migrating back to Afghanistan. Why would they? It was still safer for them in Pakistan.

Obama laid out his ground rules for the rest of the session.

“I really want to focus on the issue of the U.S. homeland,” he said. “I see three key goals. One, protecting the U.S. homeland, allies and U.S. interests abroad. Two, concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and stability. If I’m just focused on the U.S. homeland, can we distinguish between the dangers posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban?”

Biden picked up on the cue—skipping the third goal about Pakistan-India relations—and asked, “Is there any evidence the Afghan Taliban advocates attacks outside of Afghanistan and on the U.S., or if it took over more of Afghanistan it would have more of an outward focus?”

No evidence, Lavoy said. Biden had scored a significant point.

The president returned to his previous train of thought and said, “Changing the Pakistan calculus is key to achieving our core goals.”

The U.S. was in the throes of deciding whether to send more troops into the Afghanistan War, yet the safety of the nation hinged on Pakistan.

Obama said that there was a military assumption that a lasting presence in Afghanistan would stabilize Pakistan. What was the basis of that? he asked. Why wouldn’t the opposite happen?

Petraeus spoke up. A little more than a month ago, he had met in Pakistan with General Kayani, head of the Pakistani army, whose influence and power were increasing. For two hours, Petraeus sat with a map as the Pakistanis walked him through their plans and operations. Their calculus was changing, as they now factored in extremist terrorist groups such as TTP. That Pakistani branch of the Taliban had used suicide bombers against government targets and earlier in the year had controlled the area near Tarbela, where Pakistan stored some of its nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani military had already launched a ground operation in Swat and was about to do the same in South Waziristan. That was an encouraging sign.

McChrystal then delivered a presentation on what he called “The Pathway” to his initial assessment, outlining how he had arrived at what he thought were his missions and how he assessed his ability to accomplish them.

“Okay,” Obama said, “You guys have done your job. But there are three developments since then. The Pakistanis are doing better, the Afghanistan situation is more serious than anticipated, and the Afghan elections did not provide the pivot point hoped for—a more legitimate government. And now we have to make some decisions.”

They turned to a chart from McChrystal that listed extremist threats—al Qaeda, the Taliban and other groups. Could some be isolated, and should the administration worry only about those that posed a threat to the homeland?

Biden and deputy national security adviser Donilon voiced skepticism that the symbiotic relationships among them meant the United States had to go after all of them.

The vice president felt he should correct the analysis by Lavoy that, if able, al Qaeda would likely return to a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

“We hear that from some in the intelligence community,” Biden said, “but it seems to me much more ambiguous. First of all, would al Qaeda go back if it deemed it was unsafe to operate in Afghanistan? Probably not. Second, Pakistan’s a much more connected country from which to operate, so it clearly prefers that. And then more important, as I said earlier, there are real questions about whether the Taliban would welcome al Qaeda back, since association with the group carries with it a real security threat to Afghanistan.”

Biden then devoted the rest of his monologue to the assumption also challenged by the president, the idea that as goes Afghanistan, so goes Pakistan.

“I think it’s exactly the opposite,” he said, “that what happens in Afghanistan may have some impact but it won’t fundamentally change the outcome in Pakistan. There are many different issues and factors influencing the direction Pakistan takes. Afghanistan’s one, but only one of them. But conversely, when it comes to Afghanistan, the role Pakistan plays is determinate, and particularly if it continues to harbor the leadership of the Afghan Taliban and give them the sanctuary, it’s impossible to succeed.”

It was about an hour and 45 minutes into the meeting and Secretary of Defense Gates had said nothing.

“Bob,” Obama said at one point, leaning back in his chair, “I’d love to hear what you’re thinking. I know still waters run deep. What’s on your mind?”

“I’d like to think about broadening the top priority beyond the homeland to include our interests abroad,” Gates said, “key allies, partners, our forces overseas around the world. The focus is al Qaeda and the degree to which al Qaeda would be empowered by a Taliban success. If the Taliban make significant headway, it’ll be framed as the defeat of the second superpower. I don’t see the chance of real reconciliation until the Taliban is under pressure. Al Qaeda likely would stay where they are in the FATA if the Taliban took over, unless pressure in the FATA reaches a critical point.” Supporting Lavoy from the previous session, Gates said, “But we should recognize that al Qaeda is a leech on the Taliban and to the degree that the Taliban is successful, helps al Qaeda.”

Obama turned to another metaphor to explain one step America had to take: “We need to drain the swamp and reduce the appeal of violent extremism to young Muslims. We need to elevate our public affairs and our civilian affairs.

“The Pakistan core goal is right,” the president said. That goal was to eliminate the al Qaeda safe havens, so chasing the Taliban might be a distraction to that. “If there is an opportunity cost in order to go after the Taliban, it might not be a wise move to go after the Taliban.”

This sounded alarm bells for Gates, Mullen, Petraeus and McChrystal. There wasn’t much the president could say that could be more disturbing to the military. His statement seemed to question the very wisdom of the war in Afghanistan.

But before any of the military leaders could respond, Biden interrupted to push for a counterterrorism strategy that would involve fewer additional troops. Some leaders in the region, the vice president said, had concerns about the growing U.S. military presence, or footprint, in the Middle East and South Asia. He was referring to Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah.

Petraeus responded, “Those are the same ones that had a concern about our footprint in Iraq as well, and that was disproved.” He reminded them that the biggest of the big ideas in his CentCom strategic assessment from earlier in the year was that combating terrorism required “a whole of governments” approach. This meant the U.S. could not go it alone but had to work with the governments of other countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In fact, at a speech up the road at the National Press Club the week before, Petraeus had lauded the Saudis’ help against al Qaeda.

McChrystal then chimed in to assist his boss and contradict Biden’s belief that counterterrorism automatically involved a smaller footprint than counterinsurgency.

“Counterterrorist decapitation”—capturing or killing terrorist leaders—“doesn’t work unless it is enabled by effective counterinsurgency,” he said. “They complement each other.”

Petraeus took them back to Iraq once more. “We killed Zarqawi in Iraq,” he said, “probably the best, most competent, charismatic leader in al Qaeda overall, in terms of real battlefield leaders, and the violence continued to go up.” Zarqawi’s death in June 2006 did not bring peace or stability. Special Operations were commanded at the time by then Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal.

Sitting on the sidelines, Axelrod was not surprised that Petraeus kept referring to Iraq. He was “Mr. Counterinsurgency,” as Axelrod privately called him. Axelrod had been told that Petraeus’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual had become a hymnal for young Army officers, who were promoted if they mastered its songs. Mr. Counterinsurgency believed he could simply take his Iraq model on the road. Axelrod thought Afghanistan would be exponentially more demanding than Iraq—different mix of population, different culture, low literacy rate, tough terrain. As an expression of his absolute confidence in Obama, Axelrod thought the president was well aware of all of this and understood the region and its history. Despite Obama’s youth and lack of experience, Axelrod believed the president was such a fast learner that he could be a counterbalance to Petraeus.

Toward the end of the meeting, Secretary Clinton asked, “How would additional forces be used?” Where would the troops go? Would they be trainers? How many enablers? How would the lessons learned from Iraq be applied?

Donilon, the deputy national security adviser, then listed the information they would try to get and questions they would address in deputies committee meetings. “We’ll refine the intel products,” he said. “We’ll reconsider the goals. Who are the extremist allies? Does the Taliban have to be defeated?”

“What does it mean?” the president asked, breaking in. “Address what it means to break the Taliban momentum. Do we really need to get to the Taliban to degrade al Qaeda? We’ve made progress against al Qaeda despite the lack of momentum against the Taliban.”

Yes, sir.

Petraeus left the meeting troubled by the unfolding narrative. Progress was being made against al Qaeda with the drone strikes in Pakistan, yet Pakistan was emerging as the necessary war. And accordingly, Afghanistan, his counterinsurgency war, was becoming the secondary war.

The highest-level intelligence analysis had never provided a conclusive argument for acting in Afghanistan now. But there was a compelling argument that if the tide of the war was not stemmed, the Afghan government’s decline would be inevitable. It might be a slow death. It might take a decade. But there would be a point where the decline would become irreversible, when sending in another 50,000 troops or more would not help. And a completely destabilized Afghanistan would sooner or later destabilize Pakistan. And so the question for the president and his team was: Could the United States take that risk?

After the September 30 meeting, the president asked Gates for a copy of McChrystal’s troop request. McChrystal’s basic recommendation of 40,000 had already leaked, but there was an extraordinary amount of secrecy surrounding the document itself. To prevent further leaks, a limited number of copies were available and handling them was severely restricted. The 11-page document, dated September, 24 2009, was classified SECRET/NOFORN. Entitled, “Resourcing the ISAF implementation strategy,” it did not leak.

It was six months later when I had a chance to review the document, which a source for this book provided to me. The contrast to McChrystal’s Afghanistan assessment astounded me. They seemed to share an author in name only. Bureaucratic phrases and eye-glazing sentences replaced the impressive candor from the assessment.

McChrystal listed three troop options:

1. 10,000–11,000 to mostly train the Afghan forces;

2. 40,000 for a counterinsurgency;

3. 85,000 for a more robust counterinsurgency.

Finally at the end, McChrystal got to his bottom line:

“Professional Military Judgment: Thus after careful military analysis of the current situation, I recommend the addition of four combat brigades with enablers”—or 40,000.

In essence, McChrystal said, give me 40,000 more troops and I’ll try my damnedest.

Around that time, the CBS show 60 Minutes aired a prerecorded interview with McChrystal, who said he had only spoken with President Obama once in the last 70 days, and that was by secure video. His answer made the commander in chief look oddly removed from the war. The bloggers pounced and the president was criticized in a New York Times article. The White House decided to arrange a meeting with the general. Obama was flying to Denmark to pitch Chicago as the host of the 2016 Olympics and McChrystal was scheduled to be in London, where Jones assumed he was on a rest-and-relaxation trip.

But McChrystal had come to London for a reunion with British Special Forces who had fought in Iraq. An invitation to address the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank, had also come in and Mullen told him to accept it.

“Obviously, you need to be careful,” Mullen said.

Every three-star who made four-star has had to grow, Mullen later reflected. McChrystal’s challenge was that he would have to grow on a world stage.

During McChrystal’s October 1 speech at the institute, he stuck to his assessment that only a counterinsurgency strategy could work. He declared the importance of resolve and warned of the demoralizing impact of uncertainty.

McChrystal tried to joke with the audience about his speech. “If this works according to my plan, it will totally exhaust your appetite for this issue and I will leave the room to wild cheers and lucrative job offers. If my plan fails, as most of mine do, I will be happy to field any questions.”

It was a discordant start by the commander of a major war five months into his assignment, talking about lucrative job offers and failed plans.

After his prepared remarks, he was asked if a limited, scaled-back effort to go after the terrorists could succeed. His answer was unequivocal. “The short answer is: No. You have to navigate from where you are, not where you wish to be. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a shortsighted strategy.”

He said he had been encouraged to state his case bluntly in his confidential assessment. He praised the process of Washington deliberations, but laughed when he said he might not always be free to speak out, adding, “They may change their minds, and crush me someday.”

McChrystal’s comments marked a seminal moment for the White House staff. What better proof that the military was on a search-and-destroy mission aimed at the president? Emanuel, Donilon and McDonough were furious. Even Jones was shocked. “It was another Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment,” he said. Was it possible that having led a sheltered existence in the secretive Special Operations Command left McChrystal this ignorant of public relations?

Already on his flight to Denmark, Obama said, “We got to stop this. This is not helping.”

McChrystal told Petraeus, “I know I screwed this up. I’m going to lie low.” Petraeus had previously hoped everything between the White House and the military had calmed down. He passed word to Gates, who told the president that McChrystal knew the speech had been inappropriate.

Obama and McChrystal met aboard Air Force One in Denmark the next day for 25 minutes. Neither dwelt on the speech, but both acknowledged that it wouldn’t happen again.

McChrystal stood by his written 66-page assessment but added, “Mr. President, you describe the mission and we’ll do whatever we need to carry it out.”

By both accounts, there were no fireworks or rebukes. Obama was controlled. When the president returned home, he told Axelrod and Gibbs, “I like him. I think he’s a good man.” McChrystal was the right man for the job, he said, but added that the output they got from the military had a lot to do with the input given by the civilian commanders, Gates and himself. McChrystal’s mission was circumscribed and limited to Afghanistan, Obama noted, but as they were learning, the real problems stemmed from Pakistan.

Colin Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who as a young officer had worked with McChrystal’s father, Major General Herbert J. McChrystal, Jr., e-mailed McChrystal recommending that it was time to lower his profile.

The president had already agreed to 21,000 more troops and a request for 40,000 more was on its way. This was probably one of the biggest shocks a president could receive, hauntingly reminiscent of the June 7, 1965, request by General William Westmoreland for 41,000 more troops in Vietnam. In his 1995 book, In Retrospect, Robert McNamara called Westy’s request a “bombshell” that “meant a dramatic and open-ended expansion of American military involvement. Of the thousands of cables I received during my seven years in the Defense Department, this one disturbed me most. We were forced to make a decision.”

Facing an unexpected and stunning strategic request was not where Obama had planned to be in the fall of the first year of his presidency. On top of that, the military was out campaigning, closing off his choices, and the White House was losing control of the public narrative.

Obama vented to Emanuel, Axelrod and Donilon. He became the most impassioned with Donilon, the national security staffer with whom he spent the most time. By one account, Donilon told a colleague that the president was stabbing his finger at his deputy national security adviser’s chest so much that he almost had a bruise there.

Obama wanted to know how he had arrived at this place. Why did I give them the troops in February? Those troops haven’t gotten there yet. They’re about to ask for a game-changing number and they’re going to the public and leaking it to trap us.

Donilon unloaded on many people at the Pentagon, invoking the president’s name and insisting Obama wanted this fixed immediately. He was a lawyer with one client—the president. But instead of absorbing Obama’s frustration, he was a pure transmission belt for it. He took the heat from the president and retransmitted it, eliciting sniping that Donilon didn’t have the broad experience needed for the sensitive White House position and lived in a lawyer’s bunker. Donilon had not even visited Afghanistan. He had no feel for the situation on the ground or for the military. He had hosed down Pentagon officials and in the process come close to endangering his relationships with some of them, including Gates.

Jones was dumbfounded by McChrystal. How could he give such a speech and answer so categorically while the president sought alternative strategies? The whole thing amazed him, particularly after the White House had scolded Mullen and Petraeus for their comments weeks earlier.

The national security adviser told Gates that McChrystal’s speech was an over-the-top moment and the president had demonstrated a lot of restraint.

“You’ve simply got to stop this,” he said, “or the president is going to have to fire somebody.”

A frustrated Gates said he thought he had taken the necessary steps, including issuing guidance to prevent incidents like this from happening.

Jones thought this was not a matter of guidance but of common sense, which was sadly lacking.

Furious, he also called Admiral Mullen, McChrystal’s biggest booster. “I don’t know what you guys are doing,” he said. McChrystal’s speech was either “insubordination or stupid.” It read like a direct challenge to the president.

“It is a firing offense, but McChrystal won’t be fired because we need him,” Jones said. Referring to Mullen and Petraeus, Jones said, “One of you is going to get fired and I’m going to recommend it.” Repeating his previous warning, Jones said, “You’re losing altitude.”

It had largely been a one-sided conversation with Jones. Mullen had gotten little chance to talk. One of his responsibilities as the Joint Chiefs chairman was to prevent a breach between the president (and his senior civilian staff) and the uniformed military. Mullen knew that such a breach, even short of firings, could be catastrophic. His job entailed protecting President Obama from the military, which had enormous stature with the public. But it also meant protecting the military from the president, who after all was the commander in chief. The relationship was not heading in the right direction.

Was Jones speaking for the president? Were his comments—threats really—the eruption of a retired four-star offended by his peers? Or was Jones trying to protect and insulate the president? Jones had been hired as a counterweight to Gates and the Pentagon brass. Was he trying to protect himself?

When Mullen and Gates met with Obama for their next weekly meeting, the president raised McChrystal’s remarks.

This was something that really put me in a box, Obama said, and I don’t like being boxed in.

“It will never happen again,” Mullen said. “It was not intentional.”

Obama felt disrespected and trapped. The White House saw the speech as a scheme on the part of McChrystal, Mullen and Petraeus.

“We didn’t do that,” Mullen tried to reassure him. “We would never do that intentionally.”

Jones had been dealing with his own turmoil inside the NSC for several months. A giant thorn in his side had been Mark Lippert, the 36-year-old who had parlayed his three years as Obama’s Senate foreign policy aide into an appointment as NSC chief of staff. Jones believed Lippert was leaking derogatory and defamatory information about him to the media and undermining him inside the White House. Jones had had a couple of come-to-Jesus meetings with him, but to no avail.

Lippert, a Navy Reserve lieutenant (junior grade) intelligence officer, had deployed to Iraq during the presidential campaign, but he remained as tight as ever with Obama. The president called him “brother.” It was a proximity and comfort—even friendship—that Jones did not have with Obama. He had surveyed the daily schedule of Steve Hadley, his predecessor as national security adviser. Hadley often spent six hours or even the whole day with President Bush, much of it for routine meetings and phone calls.

Jones did not want to be seen as hovering around Obama. But his low-key, low-profile approach appeared to verify the whisper campaign that portrayed him as an out-of-touch national security adviser who only worked 12-hour days when many of the younger staff stayed in their West Wing offices until late at night. The criticism had grown so intense among some blogs and foreign policy publications that Jones gave interviews to reporters from The Washington Post and The New York Times in early May.

The resulting articles failed to halt the whisper campaign. On June 11, Fox News reported that Jones was not up to the job, saying, “One NSC staff member claimed that Jones is so forgetful that at times he appears to have Alzheimer’s disease.” An outraged Jones kept the notes of the broadcast in his office.

Jones finally went to talk to Emanuel about the leaks he believed were coming from Lippert.

“When I heard it three times, I ignored it,” he said. “Then four, five, six times. Longtime friends said that someone was providing this, and they said they can’t say who but his initials are M.L.” Emanuel had to find Lippert another job.

“You’ll have to talk to the president,” Emanuel said. “This is his guy.”

In July, Jones laid out his case to Obama and others. All seemed to agree that it was rank insubordination. Obama promised to move on Lippert.

“I will tell him,” Obama told Jones.

It took more than two months. On October 1, the day of the McChrystal speech in London, the White House press secretary issued a three-paragraph statement that Lippert was returning to active duty in the Navy. The statement made it sound as though this had been Lippert’s choice.

“I was not surprised,” Obama said in the statement, “when he came and told me he had stepped forward for another mobilization, as Mark is passionate about the Navy.”

Jones was quoted as saying, “Mark has been vital to building a strong and revitalized National Security Council, ready to address the myriad challenges we face in the 21st century. I’m confident that Mark will continue to serve his nation in the United States Navy with the same commitment and sense of patriotism that we benefited from here in the White House. I congratulate him on this new post.”

Jones was also contemplating who might succeed him as national security adviser. He was thinking about an exit strategy. His deputy, Donilon, had become indispensable. The lawyer was an office junkie, staying later, reading more and generating the agendas and memos and tasking orders like no other. He was on track to lead some 147 deputies committee meetings that year—occasionally two or three a day. These were often sophisticated reviews of policy, intelligence and in-depth backgrounders.

Jones was impressed, but he also resented the close relationship that Donilon had with Emanuel, Axelrod and some of the others. He still chafed that the main pipeline continued to be Emanuel–Donilon, who were like two tuning forks—when one vibrated, so did the other.

In good Marine Corps tradition, Jones believed that all key subordinates were entitled to a performance evaluation. He called Donilon into his office.

“I will leave at some point,” Jones said, suggesting it might be sooner rather than later. He had always tried to set up a successor in his previous jobs, he said. “Maybe you’re my replacement, maybe not,” but let me give you my sense of where you stand, what you’re doing right and what you may be doing wrong.

Jones praised his substantive and organizational skills, and told Donilon that he was indispensable to the president, the principals—including Jones—the whole interagency and NSC staff. But Donilon had made three mistakes. First, he had never gone to Afghanistan or Iraq, or really left the office for a serious field trip. As a result, he said, you have no direct understanding of these places. “You have no credibility with the military.” You should go overseas. The White House, Situation Room, interagency byplay, as important as they are, are not everything.

Second, Jones continued, you frequently pop off with absolute declarations about places you’ve never been, leaders you’ve never met, or colleagues you work with. Gates had mentioned this to Jones, saying that Donilon’s sound-offs and strong spur-of-the-moment opinions, especially about one general, had offended him so much at an Oval Office meeting that he nearly walked out.

Third, he said, you have too little feel for the people who work day and night on the NSC staff, their salaries, their maternity leaves, their promotions, their family troubles, all the things a manager of people has to be tuned into. “Everything is about personal relations,” Jones said.

On Friday, October 2, Gates invited Pakistani Ambassador Haqqani to the Pentagon for one of their periodic lunches.

Haqqani felt upbeat as he strolled through the Pentagon’s outer E-Ring hallway. There was progress on so many fronts. In the next few weeks, the Pakistani army would move into Waziristan, an offensive President Zardari had pushed for. Since he had lost support by being pro-American, Zardari thought he could gain support by being tough on the Taliban.

Haqqani’s relationship with Gates, as with other important Washington figures, was carefully nurtured. He had known the defense secretary for more than two decades.

They sat in the secretary’s private dining room, with its view through bulletproof glass of the Potomac River. An assistant defense secretary joined them to take notes.

As the president had suggested two days before, Gates had an explicit message for Haqqani.

“We are not leaving,” he told Haqqani, asking him to note that in his cable to Islamabad. “We are not leaving Afghanistan. How many more troops to put in and for what purpose, that is the question. What kind of troops and for what purpose? There is no interest whatsoever in reducing the number of troops already present in Afghanistan.”

Haqqani unfurled a shopping list of gear and vehicles that the Pakistani military needed. Congress had given them the equivalent of a Pentagon gift card, approving a $400 million fund in May to pay for improvements to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency arsenal.

Haqqani scrolled through the must-haves. Cargo helicopters, Beechcraft 350 aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision devices, IED jammers, aviation maintenance support, communications monitoring equipment, frigates and P-3C Orion airplanes to conduct maritime surveillance. This could all help with the Pakistani army’s upcoming offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan.

Gates instantly okayed almost everything on the list but chose to be noncommittal on the frigates and P-3C Orions. They would have little use in the landlocked tribal areas where the Taliban and al Qaeda were.

With the buying spree out of the way, Haqqani brought up the $1.6 billion that America owed the Pakistani military for conducting operations along the Afghan border. After 9/11, the U.S. set up an expense account for Pakistan and other countries called the Coalition Support Fund. It reimbursed allies for their assistance, although a scathing 2008 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office said the U.S. could not verify more than $2 billion in Pakistani claims. The new $1.6 billion had steadily accumulated between May 2008 and March 2009. For Pakistan, the tab was equal to more than 30 percent of its defense budget, according to CIA estimates. Haqqani pressed for the money and Gates promised to look into it.